Humanities Homework Help

Week 2 Legislative Approaches to Human-Animal Relations

PETPO v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990 (2017) (find online through MSU Library databases)

1. What were the plaintiffs seeking from the court

2. What was the legal holding of the court and what reasoning justified the holding?

3. What is your opinion of the court’s decision?

Karina L. Schrengohst, “Animal Law–Cultivating Compassionate Law: Unlocking the Laboratory Door and Shining Light on the Inadequacies & Contradictions of the Animal Welfare Act.” Western New England Law Review 33, No. 3 (2011): 855-900. (find online through MSU Library databases)

1. What is Schrengohst’s argument regarding the Animal Welfare Act?

2. What is “speciesism” and what role does it play in the author’s argument?

3. Is this an argument for recognizing rights as held by animals, or an argument that humans have obligations toward animals (but without recognizing rights in animals themselves)?

Jerrold Tannenbaum, “Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights,” Social Research 62, No. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 539-59. (find online through MSU Library databases)

1. What is Tannenbaum’s thesis?

2. In the first portion of the Tannenbaum article, what does he contend is the problem with the “activist” view of animals-as-property?

3. What is the historical distinction between wild and domestic animals?

4. What role has the concept of “cruelty” played in the legal history of human-animals relations?

5. Does Tannenbaum believe cruelty laws have achieved what their proponents sought? Why or why not? Explain, with references to the text.

https://www.montclair.edu/library/ thats the link of the library . please let me know if you need have questions.

thats the comment for the first work that you wrote

Comments:

WEEK 1 Krauthammer op-ed from Washington Post 1. What is Krauthammer’s thesis and what evidence is used to support it? 2. Do you agree with his argument? Why or why not? Explain. Krauthammer seems somewhat ambivalent about how animals should be treated and why he has become skeptical of human use of animals for product experimentation and food. He still favors eating animals, though he seems to feel a bit guilty about how they might have been treated before being slaughtered. He definitely favors humans over animals when it comes to concern for human welfare. That is, animals are of use to humans; they are things to be used for humans’ benefit. This appears to be an example of “speciesist” thought, which means valuing one species over another simply because of its species-specific characteristics. Speciesism is considered immoral by some, irrelevant by others. Nevertheless, we must also consider Krauthammer’s claim regarding historicism; that is, the contention that humans will one day come to abhor all, or almost all, use of animals for human pleasure and sustenance. Why does he predict such a future? Although he fails to state it, he suggests that it is because animals possess the ability to suffer; they possess sentience. Krauthammer recalls the zoos of his youth (and many still exist) where the animals lie around seemingly morose, bored and almost lifeless. He also voices a concern for the “dignity” of circus animals. This suggests more than an awareness of animals’ sentience. It suggests a concern for their integrity as fellow living creatures, independent of their ability to suffer or any cognitive functionality. Krauthammer also claims that future technological change will likely allow for substitutes for animals as food. Robert Garner, “Political Science and Animal Studies,” Society and Animals Vol. 10, No. 4 (2002), pp. 395-401. 1. According to Garner’s article, what are the various explanations for why people join animal rights groups? Using Olson’s work (1965), Garner cites the “selective incentives” argument, wherein people have incentives to join groups, such as social and material benefits they could not otherwise obtain. Garner’s work supports this thesis, to a degree. He notes foundation grants and legacies can compensate animal rights group members and entrepreneurs pay the costs of startup and operations. However, Garner notes that ideology plays a big role, too. He notes research on the use of “moral shocks” that inspire people to join and notes that most members of animal rights groups share political ideological positions, and are mostly left-leaning in their politics. 2. What is the difference between a “pressure group” and a “new social movement”? A pressure group is conventionally political in character and seeks to influence public policy (e.g., law). Such groups work within the existing political system and do not seek to radically change the system. By contrast, new social movements are broader in scope and potential degrees of following. Politics and law matter to social movement groups, but their politics also involves lifestyle differences and often “direct action” and radical political tactics. Some new social movement groups would be considered outside the political mainstream and often less effective at creating and effectuating new public policy. The Nonhuman Rights Project v. Stanley, Petitioner’s Memo 1. What are the factual allegations made by the petitioner? 2. What are the legal theories used by the petitioner? 3. What does the petitioner want the court to do? What’s the result, legally and practically, the petitioner is seeking? The suit seeks habeas relief (release from captivity) for two chimpanzees (Hercules and Leo) possessed and owned by research institutions of the State of New York. Habeas petitions are usually used for humans in state and federal prison who challenge the conditions of their confinement or the grounds for their imprisonment. Since animals are considered a form of property, this suit is trying to break new legal ground by seeking recognition of such rights for animals. The lawyers for the Nonhuman Rights Project (NRP) make a distinction between humans and legal persons, which is a legal fiction allowed under the law for entities made by people, such as for-profit and non-profit businesses. The NRP supports their claim with affidavits from primatologists, arguing that chimps possess sentience and veritable consciousness (2). Also, they argue that to deny the chimps common law personhood rights would be a denial of equal protection under the law and that they are illegally enslaved (3). They also claim the legislature recognized them as legal persons since they have been the beneficiaries of a state-sanctioned trust. The relief sought by the NRP is to release the chimps to be housed at a sanctuary facility. The NRP argues that genetic and physiological evidence supports the claim to legal personhood. They argue that chimps are very like humans, in physiognomy and brain structure, including the similarity of brain functionality, and genetics. This approach suggests the NRP is emphasizing Aristotelian view of justice: if a creature has reasoning capacity, then it deserves to be included in justice. If you are interested in what happened to Leo and Hercules, you can read their story here: https://www.nonhumanrights.org/hercules-leo/ Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013) As the Texas Supreme Court opinion indicates, the common law denied humans the ability to recover for the death of another. It was only in the 20th century, when states enacted statutes allowing for spouses and estates to recover for the “wrongful death” – committed negligently, recklessly, or intentionally – of another, that civil lawsuits for the death of another were allowed. What is the reasoning supporting the court’s decision in Strickland? 1. What is the court’s reasoning? 2. What are the interest groups? The court endorses legal reasoning and political reasoning. Regarding legal reasoning, the holding of the case is as follows: A) dogs are personal property (sometimes called “chattel”) for damages purposes; thus, plaintiff-owners can recover for their deaths, but only the property value, not the emotional trauma or emotional damages value. B) Dogs’ property damage values are measured by either their market value (sale value) or the value of the services or usefulness of the dog. Companionship and owner affection cannot serve as the basis for measuring damages. The court considered the emotional value to be too subjective and therefore not easily quantifiable. The commercial value of the dog, by contrast, is quantifiable and objective. The base rule is that “mental anguish” is recoverable only for torts to persons, not property-animals. Additionally, the court was concerned not only with being consistent with precedents, but also the public policy implications if it allowed recovery for emotional trauma regarding a pet’s death or injury. The court noted the majority of amicus curae (“friend of the court” briefs) filed against the idea of recovery. The interest groups, including pet welfare groups (and the court), feared that the costs of keeping and caring for a pet would be raised by allowing lawsuits for emotional anguish. They feared kennels, veterinarians, animal-rescuers, dog sitters, etc., would be put out of business, resulting in more animals abandoned and euthanized. Also, they were concerned with police officers’ liability for quick decisions and the likelihood of increased liability insurance premiums. Also, the court was concerned with the elevation of human-pet relations above other human-human relations. Current law only allows a “loss of consortium” claim for spousal relations and parent-child relations. Other relations, such as aunts/uncles, cousins, siblings, grandparent-grandchild, etc., lack any ability to recover based on the nature of the relationship. Finally, the court cited the slippery slope argument: Where will it end? What kinds of pet relations will be allowed recovery? Citing all of the above reasons, the court declares this to be a policy question best resolved by the state legislature. The court cites Tennessee, Maryland, and Illinois as states that have allowed recovery in certain instances, all of which were allowed through legislative action. As to the list of interest groups, see footnotes 59 and 60 in the opinion. OWNERSHIP OF ANIMALS: Some general comments on what it means to “own” something, including an animal. Ownership tends to mean a series of rights: the ability to control, exclude others, use the property as you wish (within the law), the ability to sell or buy or inherit or transfer through an estate. Yet, there are limits on what one can do with one’s own property. Ownership is a socio-legal concept, which means it has social ramifications because it is recognized by the governmental legal system. The authority of the law supports ownership claims and rights, thereby giving power – including power over the fates of things owned (including animals) – to owners. Title is the overarching concept of ownership. One must prove this, too, usually with documentation. With title comes the abilities and obligations regarding property, with some special duties regarding animals. As noted last week, there are certain, identifiable abilities that come with ownership: the rights to exclude, control, use, consume, possess, sell/buy/transfer, inherit/devise, (sometimes) to destroy. These rights for people exists in regard to animals owned by people, too. The states control these rights and often there needs to be a license to keep an animal in certain jurisdictions. Owners of animals have to maintain them in good health, not engage in cruelty, and prevent the animals from harming others’ property and animals, or other people. PHILOSOPHY OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMANS AND OTHER CREATURES: We start with Aristotle, the Classical Greek philosopher. Aristotle was primarily concerned with the capacity of humans to reason, which he deemed animals (or nonhuman animals) to lack. Rationality is the touchstone of Aristotle’s (and many ancient philosophers’) conception of humanity. The soul, as Aristotle understood it, following on his teacher Plato’s conception, has three parts: desire, spirit (emotions and motives), and reason. Animals definitely have desires and may even have spiritedness; but Aristotle was convinced animals lack reasoning. Without reasoning, animals cannot be entitled to justice. Justice was due to humans because they have the ability to think and consider alternatives for action. Humans can determine their actions through reasoned deliberation. They make choices to do good or bad and can evaluate what choices will lead to good results for themselves and for other humans. They have the ability to reflect upon their reasons for action and to consider possible alternative actions. From Aristotle’s perspective (and the degree of knowledge at the time he lived in the 4th century BCE) there was no basis for attributing rationality to animals. Also, Aristotle concluded that since animals were not included in justice, they are things that exist for the purposes of humans. ANTI-CRUELTY LAWS: Anti-cruelty laws do not give animals rights, but they do treat animals as an unusual and special kind of property. Animals are not merely things, like a book or ball, that can be disposed of, mistreated, and destroyed with impunity. The anti-cruelty laws seek to protect animals without giving them, as living entities per se, rights. Of course, anti-cruelty laws also allow for treatment of animals that some consider abusive per se, such as serving as subjects for medical and commercial experimentation, captivity in zoos and circuses, and even as pets. Owners of animals not only must not violate anti-cruelty laws but must also control the animals so that other animals, people, and property are not harmed. The types of harm a person can do to an animal may be evaluated under different standards, such as “strict liability” (liability without fault), or negligence (failure to observe the degree of care and conduct a reasonable person would / should adhere to in the same or similar context), and intentional acts. The degree of culpability will determine whether an owner is liable under civil law or criminal law. Transfers must be done with a concern for the animal’s welfare, including modes of physical transport, veterinary care needs and costs, concerns regarding the spread of animal-borne diseases, population control measures and requirements (depending on the jurisdiction), and planning for care after an owner dies. Sometimes the type (breed, species) will matter under statutes or even prior common law court decisions in terms of the ethical/legal obligations upon owners and their handling of animals. Pet stores are often discussed when considering the ethics of animal sales/transfers of ownership. The welfare of the animals is a prime concern when they are sold in bulk.

Comments:

WEEK 1 Krauthammer op-ed from Washington Post 1. What is Krauthammer’s thesis and what evidence is used to support it? 2. Do you agree with his argument? Why or why not? Explain. Krauthammer seems somewhat ambivalent about how animals should be treated and why he has become skeptical of human use of animals for product experimentation and food. He still favors eating animals, though he seems to feel a bit guilty about how they might have been treated before being slaughtered. He definitely favors humans over animals when it comes to concern for human welfare. That is, animals are of use to humans; they are things to be used for humans’ benefit. This appears to be an example of “speciesist” thought, which means valuing one species over another simply because of its species-specific characteristics. Speciesism is considered immoral by some, irrelevant by others. Nevertheless, we must also consider Krauthammer’s claim regarding historicism; that is, the contention that humans will one day come to abhor all, or almost all, use of animals for human pleasure and sustenance. Why does he predict such a future? Although he fails to state it, he suggests that it is because animals possess the ability to suffer; they possess sentience. Krauthammer recalls the zoos of his youth (and many still exist) where the animals lie around seemingly morose, bored and almost lifeless. He also voices a concern for the “dignity” of circus animals. This suggests more than an awareness of animals’ sentience. It suggests a concern for their integrity as fellow living creatures, independent of their ability to suffer or any cognitive functionality. Krauthammer also claims that future technological change will likely allow for substitutes for animals as food. Robert Garner, “Political Science and Animal Studies,” Society and Animals Vol. 10, No. 4 (2002), pp. 395-401. 1. According to Garner’s article, what are the various explanations for why people join animal rights groups? Using Olson’s work (1965), Garner cites the “selective incentives” argument, wherein people have incentives to join groups, such as social and material benefits they could not otherwise obtain. Garner’s work supports this thesis, to a degree. He notes foundation grants and legacies can compensate animal rights group members and entrepreneurs pay the costs of startup and operations. However, Garner notes that ideology plays a big role, too. He notes research on the use of “moral shocks” that inspire people to join and notes that most members of animal rights groups share political ideological positions, and are mostly left-leaning in their politics. 2. What is the difference between a “pressure group” and a “new social movement”? A pressure group is conventionally political in character and seeks to influence public policy (e.g., law). Such groups work within the existing political system and do not seek to radically change the system. By contrast, new social movements are broader in scope and potential degrees of following. Politics and law matter to social movement groups, but their politics also involves lifestyle differences and often “direct action” and radical political tactics. Some new social movement groups would be considered outside the political mainstream and often less effective at creating and effectuating new public policy. The Nonhuman Rights Project v. Stanley, Petitioner’s Memo 1. What are the factual allegations made by the petitioner? 2. What are the legal theories used by the petitioner? 3. What does the petitioner want the court to do? What’s the result, legally and practically, the petitioner is seeking? The suit seeks habeas relief (release from captivity) for two chimpanzees (Hercules and Leo) possessed and owned by research institutions of the State of New York. Habeas petitions are usually used for humans in state and federal prison who challenge the conditions of their confinement or the grounds for their imprisonment. Since animals are considered a form of property, this suit is trying to break new legal ground by seeking recognition of such rights for animals. The lawyers for the Nonhuman Rights Project (NRP) make a distinction between humans and legal persons, which is a legal fiction allowed under the law for entities made by people, such as for-profit and non-profit businesses. The NRP supports their claim with affidavits from primatologists, arguing that chimps possess sentience and veritable consciousness (2). Also, they argue that to deny the chimps common law personhood rights would be a denial of equal protection under the law and that they are illegally enslaved (3). They also claim the legislature recognized them as legal persons since they have been the beneficiaries of a state-sanctioned trust. The relief sought by the NRP is to release the chimps to be housed at a sanctuary facility. The NRP argues that genetic and physiological evidence supports the claim to legal personhood. They argue that chimps are very like humans, in physiognomy and brain structure, including the similarity of brain functionality, and genetics. This approach suggests the NRP is emphasizing Aristotelian view of justice: if a creature has reasoning capacity, then it deserves to be included in justice. If you are interested in what happened to Leo and Hercules, you can read their story here: https://www.nonhumanrights.org/hercules-leo/ Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013) As the Texas Supreme Court opinion indicates, the common law denied humans the ability to recover for the death of another. It was only in the 20th century, when states enacted statutes allowing for spouses and estates to recover for the “wrongful death” – committed negligently, recklessly, or intentionally – of another, that civil lawsuits for the death of another were allowed. What is the reasoning supporting the court’s decision in Strickland? 1. What is the court’s reasoning? 2. What are the interest groups? The court endorses legal reasoning and political reasoning. Regarding legal reasoning, the holding of the case is as follows: A) dogs are personal property (sometimes called “chattel”) for damages purposes; thus, plaintiff-owners can recover for their deaths, but only the property value, not the emotional trauma or emotional damages value. B) Dogs’ property damage values are measured by either their market value (sale value) or the value of the services or usefulness of the dog. Companionship and owner affection cannot serve as the basis for measuring damages. The court considered the emotional value to be too subjective and therefore not easily quantifiable. The commercial value of the dog, by contrast, is quantifiable and objective. The base rule is that “mental anguish” is recoverable only for torts to persons, not property-animals. Additionally, the court was concerned not only with being consistent with precedents, but also the public policy implications if it allowed recovery for emotional trauma regarding a pet’s death or injury. The court noted the majority of amicus curae (“friend of the court” briefs) filed against the idea of recovery. The interest groups, including pet welfare groups (and the court), feared that the costs of keeping and caring for a pet would be raised by allowing lawsuits for emotional anguish. They feared kennels, veterinarians, animal-rescuers, dog sitters, etc., would be put out of business, resulting in more animals abandoned and euthanized. Also, they were concerned with police officers’ liability for quick decisions and the likelihood of increased liability insurance premiums. Also, the court was concerned with the elevation of human-pet relations above other human-human relations. Current law only allows a “loss of consortium” claim for spousal relations and parent-child relations. Other relations, such as aunts/uncles, cousins, siblings, grandparent-grandchild, etc., lack any ability to recover based on the nature of the relationship. Finally, the court cited the slippery slope argument: Where will it end? What kinds of pet relations will be allowed recovery? Citing all of the above reasons, the court declares this to be a policy question best resolved by the state legislature. The court cites Tennessee, Maryland, and Illinois as states that have allowed recovery in certain instances, all of which were allowed through legislative action. As to the list of interest groups, see footnotes 59 and 60 in the opinion. OWNERSHIP OF ANIMALS: Some general comments on what it means to “own” something, including an animal. Ownership tends to mean a series of rights: the ability to control, exclude others, use the property as you wish (within the law), the ability to sell or buy or inherit or transfer through an estate. Yet, there are limits on what one can do with one’s own property. Ownership is a socio-legal concept, which means it has social ramifications because it is recognized by the governmental legal system. The authority of the law supports ownership claims and rights, thereby giving power – including power over the fates of things owned (including animals) – to owners. Title is the overarching concept of ownership. One must prove this, too, usually with documentation. With title comes the abilities and obligations regarding property, with some special duties regarding animals. As noted last week, there are certain, identifiable abilities that come with ownership: the rights to exclude, control, use, consume, possess, sell/buy/transfer, inherit/devise, (sometimes) to destroy. These rights for people exists in regard to animals owned by people, too. The states control these rights and often there needs to be a license to keep an animal in certain jurisdictions. Owners of animals have to maintain them in good health, not engage in cruelty, and prevent the animals from harming others’ property and animals, or other people. PHILOSOPHY OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMANS AND OTHER CREATURES: We start with Aristotle, the Classical Greek philosopher. Aristotle was primarily concerned with the capacity of humans to reason, which he deemed animals (or nonhuman animals) to lack. Rationality is the touchstone of Aristotle’s (and many ancient philosophers’) conception of humanity. The soul, as Aristotle understood it, following on his teacher Plato’s conception, has three parts: desire, spirit (emotions and motives), and reason. Animals definitely have desires and may even have spiritedness; but Aristotle was convinced animals lack reasoning. Without reasoning, animals cannot be entitled to justice. Justice was due to humans because they have the ability to think and consider alternatives for action. Humans can determine their actions through reasoned deliberation. They make choices to do good or bad and can evaluate what choices will lead to good results for themselves and for other humans. They have the ability to reflect upon their reasons for action and to consider possible alternative actions. From Aristotle’s perspective (and the degree of knowledge at the time he lived in the 4th century BCE) there was no basis for attributing rationality to animals. Also, Aristotle concluded that since animals were not included in justice, they are things that exist for the purposes of humans. ANTI-CRUELTY LAWS: Anti-cruelty laws do not give animals rights, but they do treat animals as an unusual and special kind of property. Animals are not merely things, like a book or ball, that can be disposed of, mistreated, and destroyed with impunity. The anti-cruelty laws seek to protect animals without giving them, as living entities per se, rights. Of course, anti-cruelty laws also allow for treatment of animals that some consider abusive per se, such as serving as subjects for medical and commercial experimentation, captivity in zoos and circuses, and even as pets. Owners of animals not only must not violate anti-cruelty laws but must also control the animals so that other animals, people, and property are not harmed. The types of harm a person can do to an animal may be evaluated under different standards, such as “strict liability” (liability without fault), or negligence (failure to observe the degree of care and conduct a reasonable person would / should adhere to in the same or similar context), and intentional acts. The degree of culpability will determine whether an owner is liable under civil law or criminal law. Transfers must be done with a concern for the animal’s welfare, including modes of physical transport, veterinary care needs and costs, concerns regarding the spread of animal-borne diseases, population control measures and requirements (depending on the jurisdiction), and planning for care after an owner dies. Sometimes the type (breed, species) will matter under statutes or even prior common law court decisions in terms of the ethical/legal obligations upon owners and their handling of animals. Pet stores are often discussed when considering the ethics of animal sales/transfers of ownership. The welfare of the animals is a prime concern when they are sold in bulk.