>Sociology homework help

Just answer those question after reading 3 article. Copy and paste is ok.

Kunimoto Namiko, “Olympic Dissent: Art, Politics, and the Tokyo Olympic Games of 1964 and 2020” Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus Volume 16 | Issue 15 | Number 2 (August 1, 2018)

Article ID 5180 https://apjjf.org/2018/15/Kunimoto.html

1. What is the “dokken kokka” and what is Nakamura’s critique of it?

2. How does that critique relate to the 1964 Olympics?

3. Takayama Akira organized a tour in 2007. Where did that tour go? What did they do in Harajuku?

4. Who is Makoto, and what is he worried about?

Read Koide Hiroaki and Norma Field, “The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the Tokyo Olympics,” Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus Volume 17 | Issue 5 | Number 3 (March 1, 2019)

Article ID 5256

1. How much more radiation was released into the environment in Fukushima than in Hiroshima?

2. What is the problem with the “melted core” that makes it particularly hard to deal with? (In your answer, you should consider humans, robots, and the current location of the core.)

3. What does Koide think is the only solution to the problem?

4. How long does Koide assume that the protection of the cite needs to last?

5. What did the government do in March of 2017? (Include in your answer, what happened to housing assistance? And what conditions people were told to live under.)

Read Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. “Meaning and Value in the Everyday,” from her Waste: Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. This is the introduction to a book about Japan’s trash, and what Japan wastes.
1. What is Mottainai?

2. What are the different ways of thinking about waste?

3. What class do most people in Japan identify with?

4. What are the gendered ways that the government communicates about waste? Who is assumed to be associated with which place, and what kind of waste?

5. What is the complication to the idea of the “lost” decades that the author proposes?

  • 1
    Introduction
    MEANING AND VALUE
    IN THE EVERYDAY
    A teenage girl stands in a train on her morning commute to school, her eyes fixed
    impassively on the smartphone in her hands. In front of her sit two passengers,
    asleep, catching whatever rest they can. This sense of fatigue and weariness follows her as she goes through the day, at one point standing alone in a stairwell
    with her face buried in her hands and at another gasping, “I can’t do this.” A teenage boy in his work uniform slumps back against the shelf of a convenience store
    stockroom, staring blankly in front of him at a long row of brightly lit refrigerators filled with an array of bottled and canned drinks. When the words of a
    co-worker nudge him to sit up, the distant expression on his face shows a hint
    of resignation. These two youths were the creation of an animated public service
    announcement which inscribed on the screen one word that encapsulated its
    message: “wasteful,” or in the original Japanese, mottainai.
    1
    The ad, a high-quality production in the style of a movie trailer, promised
    nothing less than the potential of mottainai to transform melancholy about
    daily routines into contentedness with a life worth living. This theme was crafted
    jointly by the nonprofit Advertising Council Japan (AC Japan) and the national
    broadcaster NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation, or Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai),
    and was promoted through the television spot in the summer of 2015 and online
    for months thereafter.2
    Its ultimately hopeful note was expressed through the arc
    of the visuals, as the early scenes of youth dejected with school, sports practice,
    and work gave way in the second half to a montage of more heartening moments
    like playing at the beach with a friend and taking time for contemplation. This
    optimism, subdued and restrained, was underscored by the wistful soundtrack
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    Created from upenn-ebooks on 2020-04-05 13:14:54. Copyright © 2018. Cornell University Press. All rights reserved.
    2 INTRODUCTION
    of piano and strings, joined in the second half by the sparkling of chimes. The
    motifs of promise and renewed search for purpose were emphasized by the intentional focus on young people with so much of their lives ahead of them. And they
    were well suited to a time when Japan, tested and tried by a series of challenges,
    was setting its sights ahead on recovery and revitalization. That the torpor of the
    present could somehow give way to a better life was explicitly expressed in a line
    presented over the closing scene: “With mottainai, the future will change.”
    Mottainai here meant more than just being wasteful. This was not an explicit
    definition or pedantic enumeration of practices that should be considered a
    waste; it was not that the teenage girl’s absorption with her smartphone or the
    teenage boy’s part-time job was being labeled wasteful.3
    Rather, what this take on
    mottainai urged was serious and purposeful reflection about what was wasteful
    in one’s day-to-day life. Throughout the spot, the voice-over listed in a steady
    cadence all that could be realized just by being attentive to this single word: you
    could be rescued and revived; become courageous, serious, introspective, and
    kind; rediscover yourself; figure things out; feel at ease; embrace aspirations; and
    start moving forward. What the announcement encouraged was consideration
    of the motivations, purposes, and desires of one’s daily life. It was the absence
    of such self-reflection, if anything, that rendered one’s time and energy wasteful.
    This was a public service announcement not about a discrete social problem but
    about the idea of waste—about deliberately figuring out what is wasteful so as to
    discover what is meaningful.
    FIGURE 0.1. Public Service Announcement about Mottainai. An early scene
    from the AC Japan and NHK public service announcement about mottainai.
    From “AC Japan CM mottainai,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXODCN6rfTc.
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
    http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5516832.
    Created from upenn-ebooks on 2020-04-05 13:14:54. Copyright © 2018. Cornell University Press. All rights reserved.
    MEANING AND VALUE IN THE EVERYDAY 3
    This conception of wastefulness bore the marks of its time. In a long and
    shifting past reaching back many decades, waste had not always been understood
    this way. As we delve into the history of how waste and wastefulness have been
    thought about in Japan, from the immediate aftermath of devastating world war
    through the more recent past, we will see how malleable and capacious these
    ideas were and how deeply they were etched by the priorities and aspirations
    of their historical moment. What the announcement also illustrated so pointedly and elegantly was a fundamental quality of waste: its remarkable capacity
    to reveal what is valuable and meaningful. A historical examination of waste can
    thus be a story of people’s many and ever-changing concerns, yearnings, disappointments, and hopes. This history of waste is at its heart a history of how
    people lived—how they made sense of, gave meaning to, and found value in the
    acts of the everyday in postwar Japan.
    Waste and Everyday Life
    To ask what has been considered waste and wasteful is to venture into various
    facets of day-to-day life, following the traces of people’s expressions about what
    they do and do not value. When attuned to waste, we find its presence in so many
    questions asked in the course of modern living. Should this tired sweater be
    thrown away? How should all my stuff be organized? Can these old leftovers in
    the fridge be eaten? Is it justifiable to spend money on the latest smartphone? Is
    it possible to be more efficient and productive at work? Can this evening be spent
    playing video games or hanging out at the neighborhood bar? The ubiquity of
    waste comes into focus when its conception is broad and inclusive of its many
    manifestations.
    Garbage, with all of its materiality, may be the most visible and tangible incarnation of waste. As many who study it have written, to categorize a thing as garbage, however mindlessly, is to implicitly reject it as valueless.4
    Once the tattered
    shirt, used plastic wrap, or paper coffee cup is discarded, it joins on the rubbish
    heap all of the detritus cast aside as useless. The amount and composition of
    trash itself is a mirror of the society responsible for its creation, and discussions
    about what to do with garbage and how to handle the afterlives of stuff suggest
    much about people’s relationship to material things, what they want to own, how
    and what they choose to consume, and how they treat their possessions.
    But waste need not be thought of just as discarded matter; it can also be
    understood more expansively as anything, material or not, that can be used and
    disused. Electricity, food, money, and time can all be wasted. Indeed, there is a
    parallel between deeming something garbage and deeming anything a waste, be it
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    4 INTRODUCTION
    of energy or money or time. All are determinations of value. This wider conception of waste allows us to see a fuller swath of what might be considered wasteful.
    Rubbish, such as a broken refrigerator or outdated videocassette recorder, can tell
    us about the societal context in which the decision to discard was made, about
    opportunities for repair, attitudes toward disposability, or planned obsolescence.
    Other versions of this kind of judgment—to deem the use of a clothes dryer a
    waste of electricity or a lengthy meeting a waste of time—can further open the
    field of historical vision. They raise questions not just about clothes dryers or
    meetings but also about understandings of electricity and of time, household
    responsibilities and practices, and attitudes toward work. Thinking about waste
    writ large makes more evident the trade-offs in decisions about what to expend
    and what to save, like whether money and electricity should be spent on a washing machine to spare physical labor and time. Highlighted too is how a thing or
    action could be wasteful in more ways than one, how a television set could be a
    waste of money, electricity, space, and time.
    Time is a purposeful inclusion, even though it is distinct in some ways from
    its material counterparts. Time cannot be accumulated like money or things;
    it cannot be reused or recycled like resources; it cannot be discarded; and it is
    always, continuously, and necessarily being expended, whether deliberately or
    not. Yet time is similar to things, resources, and money in its finite character,
    and in the linguistic possibility of its being “used,” “saved,” and “wasted.” The
    categorical boundaries between waste of different sorts can also be porous, as
    time can be seen as a resource or converted into money. And it is interconnected
    with the material. Not depleting natural resources can extend time horizons,
    being efficient can translate into earning more money and buying more stuff,
    and throwing things away can mean mortgaging the future for the present. Precisely because the material is so bound up with modern, industrial, and capitalist
    notions of time, it should not be surprising that garbage, resources, money, and
    time have all been sites of anxiety about and hopes for daily life.
    Across the various kinds of waste, the question of value remains central. And
    these determinations of value are not fixed: no object, use, or expenditure is
    inherently and unequivocally a waste.5
    To treat or describe something as a waste,
    be it pantyhose or buffets or long commutes, is to make a judgment or implication that is thoroughly subjective.6
    Because these categorizations are not stable
    or universal, something thrown away as garbage could, by a different person or
    at a different time, be recharacterized and repurposed as valuable. The washing
    machine, the disposable diaper, beer in a can, or golf club membership could
    be seen as indispensable, innocuous, or superfluous. It is because these determinations of value have been made in and shaped by a particular context that
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
    http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5516832.
    Created from upenn-ebooks on 2020-04-05 13:14:54. Copyright © 2018. Cornell University Press. All rights reserved.
    MEANING AND VALUE IN THE EVERYDAY 5
    examining what has been considered waste and wasteful can reveal the social and
    cultural concerns of that historical moment. In addition, explicit conversations
    about what should be regarded as a waste, how to distinguish between undesirable stinginess and desirable frugality, how to draw the line between necessity
    and excess, and what should be thought of as a luxury have also reflected historical misgivings and desires. It is these historical, subjective definitions of waste
    that I am trying to capture, so my concern is not with what I (or you) might
    find wasteful in postwar Japan. That would be a very different book. This story
    is about how various Japanese people at various times thought about the waste
    they saw and experienced in the world around them.
    Such ideas about waste were usually forged in and about the everyday, through
    the seemingly unremarkable regularity of the day-to-day that in postwar Japan
    as elsewhere was a principal domain of experience.7
    It was often in and about
    the mundane that people expressed their attitudes toward waste as workers, consumers, household managers, community members, and citizens. Questions of
    waste were embedded in the small decisions of daily life—about what you might
    do with a spare ten minutes between meetings; whether you should try to get
    the last bit of lotion out from the bottom of the container; how much effort you
    should put into fixing the toaster before you throw it away; how hot you need
    to feel before turning on the air conditioner; and when to upgrade to the latest
    computer model. For some, these questions elicited opinions, reflections on one’s
    own behavior, and advice for curbing waste that were explicitly voiced. For others, it was their acts of the quotidian, intentional or not, that revealed how they
    wanted to spend their time, what they thought was worth purchasing, what material things they wanted around them, and what principles or causes they viewed
    as worthy of their dedication. What people needed and wanted was reflected in
    what they said about and what they did with their things, resources, money, and
    time. That people respond to larger existential questions in the everyday was
    incisively expressed by the sociologist Anthony Giddens, who argued that “the
    question, ‘How shall I live?’ has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about
    how to behave, what to wear and what to eat—and many other things.”8
    Or put
    another way, the assumptions, habits, and decisions about waste and wastefulness were fundamentally about what people found meaningful and valuable in
    their daily lives.
    Given the centrality of the everyday to shifting constructions of waste and
    wastefulness, the various kinds of physical waste that did not intersect visibly
    and regularly with day-to-day life appear little in the pages that follow. Industrial and nuclear waste, for example, were not only categorized differently from
    household rubbish by professional managers of waste, but also were not terribly
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    6 INTRODUCTION
    relevant to understandings of waste, as pressing an issue as they were to certain
    people and communities. For most of the postwar period, their meanings were
    fairly consistent in popular imaginations as dangerous and undesirable substances that required containment. Human excrement also said little about the
    individual decisions of the day-to-day and, unlike with household garbage, its
    per capita volume neither changed significantly nor could be controlled much.
    The relatively straightforward challenge posed by the feces of increasing urban
    populations was one that could be addressed with the development of sewer
    systems. So it is touched upon only in the context of modernizing efforts around
    sanitation, health, and hygiene.9
    That these kinds of refuse receive scant attention
    should indicate that this book is not centrally about physical waste. Issues of garbage, or municipal solid waste, will certainly be discussed at length because it was
    understood as a by-product of a mass-consuming society and of a culture of disposability, and as a barometer of economic growth, views of material things, attitudes toward the environment, and more. But there will not be a march through
    the history of various categories of waste, be it medical, chemical, radioactive, or
    otherwise. What is of interest is the idea of waste more than physical waste itself.
    To write a social and cultural history of waste requires creating one’s own
    eclectic archive of sources and drawing from them attitudes and sentiments
    about wastage. A wide range of materials about the everyday forms the basis of
    this volume, revealing how day-to-day life has been at the crux of different and
    shifting thoughts about waste and wastefulness. Some of these sources could be
    characterized as mass-market, popular, even lowbrow, be they television programs, newspapers, weeklies that border on the tabloid, women’s magazines,
    and so on. These kinds of materials are quite prominent in the pages that follow; they are usually named to make clear who was presenting certain ideas
    about waste.
    Ideals of waste consciousness have often been articulated in the form of
    advice, doled out in newspapers, magazines, and mass-market books, about topics ranging from time management to electricity conservation to decluttering.
    Such advice literature has presented conceptions of waste and wastefulness more
    than it has described actual acts of waste consciousness. Advice manuals and
    books are articulations of aspirations, consumed by those whose lived experiences can be quite distant from what is depicted in their pages. As observed by
    the historian Catriona Kelly, “the relationship of behaviour books to real-life
    behaviour is complex and oblique.”10 The connections between the constructed
    ideal and actual practice have thus been probed carefully and skeptically, with
    no assumption that the world of the reader mirrored the world of the advice
    literature.
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    MEANING AND VALUE IN THE EVERYDAY 7
    Fictional literature has served, depending on the work, as social commentary, an artifact marked by the economic and societal concerns of its time,
    or an articulation, sometimes fairly opaque, of an author’s views of waste.
    Whenever possible, information has been presented about how a work circulated and by whom it was read so as to situate it in the social and cultural
    landscape of its time. And, following Michel de Certeau’s urging, some attention is given to the ways in which ideas in texts were consumed and used.11
    In fact, one chapter is dedicated entirely to the themes of, and responses to, a
    single work of fiction so as to examine the contours of discussions about waste
    and to explore how ideas could assume different shades of meaning in different hands. Fictional stories have also been told through various media, with
    some manga taking up the topic of waste. The translation of manga as “comic
    books” or even “graphic novels” does not adequately convey their scope, richness, or artistic and literary depth. Manga have been written in many genres,
    enjoyed a readership of all ages, and constituted a lucrative industry. They are
    approached here like other works of fiction, but with due attention to and
    analysis of their visual element.
    Children’s stories and books have offered clear, didactic lessons about how not
    to waste. Most that have taken up this topic are nonfiction, and their numbers
    and popularity have swelled in the 2000s. Such works have defined aspirational
    values for and attempted to shape the behavior of children, though their parents
    have been secondary targets. Because most of their attention has been focused
    on influencing the values and lifestyles of adult generations to come, they have
    been by their very nature oriented more toward the future than to the past or
    the present. The same could be said of junior high and high school textbooks
    that address issues of waste for a slightly older readership of teenagers. Typically
    assigned in home economics or sociology classes, these course materials explain
    how and why young people should think about waste. And these messages have
    had an official quality to them, presented as they were in textbooks approved by
    the Ministry of Education.
    The interests of the government have been patently apparent in its many large
    surveys that were dedicated to, or asked about, waste and everyday life. There
    were questionnaires about free time, daily life, resources, a culture of things, consumer issues, environmental problems, energy saving, and garbage. In addition
    to those conducted by the government, others were administered by citizens’
    groups, corporations, marketing firms, and research associations about environmental consciousness, attitudes toward saving, time use, energy consumption,
    recycling habits, and garbage management.12 That there were surveys and survey
    questions about waste reflects the significance of the topic. Even more revealing
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    Created from upenn-ebooks on 2020-04-05 13:14:54. Copyright © 2018. Cornell University Press. All rights reserved.
    8 INTRODUCTION
    is the wording of questions and options for multiple-choice answers, which illustrates the extent to which the surveys were exercises in moral suasion, consciousness raising, and the dissemination of information. When it comes to the survey
    results, in some cases they indicate what respondents thought the appropriate
    answer might be, while in other cases they suggest how survey takers wanted to
    see themselves. Responses that flagrantly buck the slant of the question or contradict the initiatives of the group administering the survey give a possible hint
    into how actual attitudes and behaviors deviated from the ideal. From surveys
    to children’s books, advice literature to newspaper editorials, these varied and
    sundry materials forged the many meanings—the norms, aspirations, purposes,
    and practices—of waste in everyday life.
    Waste Consciousness in Japan
    It may be tempting to assume at the outset that the history of attention to waste
    is unique to Japan, that there has existed a uniquely Japanese culture of frugality.
    Such a presumption would be understandable given American media stories and
    mass-market literature on efficiency in Japanese manufacturing, especially in the
    1980s, when there was much fascination with the country’s successes in the automotive industry. More recently, there has been journalistic coverage of exacting
    systems for recycling that require residents to sort their trash into numerous
    categories, and popular enthusiasm for a decluttering method expertly promoted
    as being Japanese.13 Some of these examples of minimizing waste resonate, I suspect, with vague impressions of Zen and its association with clean aesthetics
    and simplicity. In scholarly circles, research on generally high rates of monetary
    saving relative to the United States has encouraged a focus on Japanese thrift.14
    These characterizations have been perpetuated by various Japanese themselves
    who have suggested, with heightened enthusiasm since the early 2000s, that waste
    consciousness is a distinctively Japanese trait.
    Yet waste consciousness in postwar Japan was forged largely and primarily
    by the logics of phenomena—mass production, mass consumption, economic
    growth, affluence, material abundance, and environmentalism—that assumed
    certain forms but were not unique to Japan. The equation of waste management
    with modern civilization; the importance of productivity, efficiency, rationalization, and profit; and the indispensability of natural resources have been assumed
    and experienced globally and with shared intensity in the developed world. Ideas
    and practices like Taylorism, planned obsolescence, recycling, reuse, and decluttering have circulated widely, through and beyond national borders. Attention
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
    http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5516832.
    Created from upenn-ebooks on 2020-04-05 13:14:54. Copyright © 2018. Cornell University Press. All rights reserved.
    MEANING AND VALUE IN THE EVERYDAY 9
    to waste in Japan was not singular, even if configured and expressed in particular ways.
    The simplistic notion of an inherent and enduring waste consciousness and
    frugality also collapses when we consider that there has been no such thing as a
    “Japanese conception of waste.” What becomes apparent when we think about
    waste more capaciously, when the focus is not solely on the shop floor or the
    Zen temple or monetary savings, is that different and often contradictory understandings of waste and wastefulness have existed in Japan at the same time.
    Furthermore, the postwar history of waste is one of change more than continuity. It is about how waste consciousness waxed and waned; how what was
    considered wasteful sometimes endured and sometimes shifted; how individuals, groups of people, and governments attempted to establish new norms and
    practices around waste for many and diverse reasons; and how waste assumed
    different meanings, be they practical, didactic, economic, psychological, moral,
    spiritual, or emotional.
    However complex and familiar, the history of waste in Japan also has its particularities. Certain kinds of waste were the object of especially acute attention.
    The disposal of material waste was one such issue of special concern, in part
    because of the country’s relatively small geographic area. Discussions of household garbage gained an urgency as space in landfills was depleted and the need to
    build incinerators intensified. Of relevance too has been the scant use of limited
    domestic natural energy resources, especially after the decline of the domestic
    coal industry and the demonstrated insufficiency of hydroelectricity in the 1950s.
    Over that decade and in the 1960s, reliance on foreign oil surged such that by the
    time of the global oil crisis in 1973, the country was the world’s largest petroleum
    importer.15 With comparatively little domestic coal, oil, and natural gas, and the
    oft-repeated mantra of Japan as a “resource-poor country,” a sense of insecurity informed experiences of shortages and emergencies, and calls to not waste
    resources and energy could be especially insistent. These two aspects of the physical landscape go some way toward explaining why concerns about the waste of
    material things, resources, and energy became so tightly interwoven at formative
    moments in the construction of waste consciousness.16
    Who took up the mantle of promoting waste consciousness, and whose
    behavior was the target of waste awareness efforts, were informed by postwar
    Japanese understandings of gender roles. Gendered responsibilities and expectations often gave waste consciousness different meanings for women and
    men. The figure of the housewife loomed large when it came to the management of waste in the household. When advice was offered and entreaties were
    made about minimizing household waste, the targeted readership was typically
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
    http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5516832.
    Created from upenn-ebooks on 2020-04-05 13:14:54. Copyright © 2018. Cornell University Press. All rights reserved.
    10 INTRODUCTION
    housewives. But the boundaries of who was considered a housewife were flexible. Forming the backbone of this category were full-time housewives, but they
    were rarely the sole intended audience for messages about waste, which tended
    to be quite inclusive and sought to establish widely accepted norms. To have
    addressed only full-time housewives would have been limiting because of their
    small numbers, especially in rural areas, in the 1950s. And in the entirety of the
    postwar period, the full-time housewife married to a salaryman was an idealized
    norm but never constituted, as actual lived experience, a majority among married women.17 The implied definition was thus usually broader, with “housewife” referring to a married woman who ran the home.18 It was the status of
    marriage, more than that of part-time or full-time employment, that defined a
    woman as a housewife.
    Expectations that a housewife run the household persisted even as the percentage of women in the workforce increased from the late 1970s onward. A wife
    continued to be considered, and to assume the role of, the primary manager of
    the home.19 Part and parcel of keeping the household humming along, it was
    usually wives who dealt with household waste in its various incarnations, be it
    the scheduling of time, household finances, garbage and recycling, or electricity
    use.20 This gendering of the household as a female responsibility was reinforced
    by the sheer volume of suggestions and expectations about waste management
    in one’s family, home, and nonworking life geared toward women. Additionally,
    the realm of the household often extended beyond the home to include the local
    community. The neighborhood or residents’ associations, consumer organizations, parent-teacher associations, and citizens’ groups that took up questions of
    waste usually consisted mainly of women.21 A good number of these organizations had connections to or had the ear of municipal government officials, and
    served as sites of citizen activism around issues of waste.22
    Juxtaposed with the construction of the household as the domain of women
    was that of the workplace as the domain of men. When advice was offered and
    entreaties were made about minimizing waste in the workplace, the intended
    readership was typically male managers or white-collar workers, especially
    through the 1980s. Expectations of waste management for men assumed the
    predominance of work in their daily lives and tended to superimpose the goals
    of the workplace on the male worker. Office supplies were to be used thoroughly,
    electricity was to be conserved, and time was to be spent efficiently for the sake
    of the financial bottom line. Gender was thus salient in differentiating not just
    realms of waste consciousness but also the purposes of attention to waste.
    The centrality of the housewife, business manager, and white-collar worker
    in ideas about waste created normative conceptions of gender and waste
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    MEANING AND VALUE IN THE EVERYDAY 11
    consciousness that did not acknowledge diversity in lived experiences of the
    home or of work. The same could be said of the related construction of the
    middle class. Much of the discussion regarding waste and wastefulness, be it
    about work, leisure, or consumption, imagined a virtually universal and relatively homogeneous middle class. In some ways, this was not without basis.
    What could be called a middle-class life started to become a majority experience in the late 1950s as urban and suburban areas expanded, metropolitanism reached the countryside, employment in agriculture declined markedly,
    the number of nuclear families ticked up, and high school graduation rates
    rose.23 These developments helped reinforce the notion that almost everyone
    was part of a fairly undifferentiated middle class. Much has been made of the
    question, posed annually since 1958 by the Prime Minister’s Office in its survey of people’s lifestyles, about the social stratum in which respondents would
    place themselves. Roughly 90 percent of people have identified themselves with
    three of the five options, as being in the lower-middle, middle, or upper-middle
    class. This consistent result has fed the presumption that there has existed a
    large chūryū, usually translated as “middle class,” though it could mean something more like “mainstream.” As the anthropologist William Kelly has argued,
    this image of the middle class or mainstream has elided socioeconomic difference and “does not refer to a class category but to a category that works to
    transcend class.”24 It also does not posit the existence of a lower or working
    class against which the middle is defined.25 Even with increasing concern in
    the 2000s about Japan becoming an “unequal society” or “society of disparities” (kakusa shakai), self-identification with the middle has persisted such that
    worries about societal and economic gaps might be interpreted as those of and
    about the middle class.26
    Discussions about waste and wastefulness for much of the postwar period
    have been predicated on this vision of Japan as a middle-class society and have
    perpetuated this assumption through the definition of practices, values, and aspirations of a middle-class life. Most people who concerned themselves with waste
    did so as middle-class women and men, appealing to an audience of the same.
    Those outside the imagined mainstream and those on the socioeconomic margins have made few appearances in the construction of waste and wastefulness
    and thus also in this book. This relative absence is certainly not to suggest that
    socioeconomic disparities have been historically unimportant, nor is it intended
    to perpetuate their erasure. It speaks instead to how tightly ideas about waste and
    wastefulness were interwoven with middle-class hopes and expectations, such
    that it would be only a slight exaggeration to contend that waste consciousness
    was constitutive of middle-classness in postwar Japan.
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    12 INTRODUCTION
    A History of Postwar Japan
    This book is at once a history of waste and a history of postwar Japan. By the
    very definition of its chronological scope, it makes a case for thinking about the
    entirety of postwar Japan as one coherent and cohesive period. This is not to
    downplay the premodern history of concerns about waste, consumption, and
    luxury. Nor is it to diminish the importance of prewar precursors for many postwar approaches to waste and wastefulness. Continuities and persistence in what
    some historians have come to call “transwar Japan” are acknowledged, and historical debts to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are given their
    due.27 But the postwar period is now longer than the one that stretched from the
    Meiji Restoration to the outbreak of the Pacific War. And it can be distinguished
    not just by the longevity of conservative political rule and an international position at once weighty and subordinate, but also by a level of affluence that was
    previously unimaginable and a society of mass consumption that was virtually
    inescapable, both of which are so central to a history of waste.28 Historians of
    Japan have not yet offered many narratives of the postwar as a whole, especially
    apart from some notable edited volumes, even after the groundbreaking call
    in the early 1990s to treat “postwar Japan as history.”29 Only by examining the
    entirety of this period might we have more productive debates about its persistent challenges, moments of fracture, and defining qualities. As one step in this
    direction, this book offers a history of the long postwar with its enduring continuities, relentless struggles, and pronounced shifts.
    In the years after war’s end, in the late 1940s and 1950s, the country embarked
    on a project of re-civilization and re-enlightenment, the postwar version of modernizing efforts past. Language familiar from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries about health, hygiene, efficiency, and rationalization was used to
    urge waste consciousness in the workplace and the home. And waste was to be
    managed not only to tackle the challenges of survival just after the war, but also
    to make Japan civilized and modern once again.
    When economic recovery shifted gears into rapid growth in the latter half of
    the 1950s and the 1960s, societal and cultural adjustments were profound but
    not sudden or smooth in these years of transition into an era of unremitting
    mass consumption. In the late 1950s, as the financial and material exigencies of
    the immediate postwar began to ease, there was both discomfort and excitement
    about a burgeoning society of consumers. Different attitudes toward wastefulness took shape as people considered what was acceptable to purchase, which
    consumer desires were appropriate, and how tightly to embrace a more convenient and more comfortable life.
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    MEANING AND VALUE IN THE EVERYDAY 13
    The achievements and changes spurred by high growth were brought into
    immediate question in the early 1970s, a sharp pivot point in the postwar period
    which sparked ambivalence about affluence, reflection about national goals, and
    diversification of individual values and commitments. Concerns about waste
    became acute as worries about garbage and resources inspired responses to the
    costs and consequences of mass production, mass consumption, and preoccupation with gross national product. With questions about whether the country
    had overextended itself, waste came to be equated not with civilizational backwardness but with excess. At the same time, the desirability of a middle-class
    life had become so deeply fixed that its conveniences and comforts were not to
    be sacrificed but defended. The prospect of scrimping or going without came
    to be considered anathema to the better lives that people had come to expect.
    Consciousness of waste was thus both to change priorities and practices and to
    preserve the hard-won gains and pleasures of daily life.
    The 1980s, often excised from a longer history as an aberration because of the
    singularity of the bubble economy, should rather be treated as inextricable from
    the tapestry of the postwar. The need for the defensive posture of the previous
    decade did ebb, waste consciousness was muted, and what in years not so long
    past would have been considered luxuries became normalized as markers of the
    middle class. At the same time, the 1980s stoked not just exuberance but also dissatisfaction and unfulfilled desires. Questions were asked about what life should
    be about in a Japan of financial and material plenty, about the place of both
    things and time in a better life. Sometimes coupled with these reflections, waste
    consciousness came to be conceived in new terms of psychological, spiritual, and
    emotional satisfaction.
    The convention of characterizing all of the years from the early 1990s onward
    as “lost” is intellectually inadequate, given the languorous shift into economic
    malaise over the course of the 1990s and the distinctive notes of optimism in
    the 2000s. As societal architecture was strained to reveal and create precarity of
    various kinds, there was a pervading and disorienting sense of retrogression and
    loss.30 Yet moored by the endurance of relative affluence and mass consumption, there gradually opened a space for more expansive and variegated hopes
    for individual and societal futures. A more global environmentalism took firmer
    hold, and the broader conception of waste and meaning that had emerged in a
    previous time of economic confidence carried over into subsequent decades of
    economic malaise. In the 2000s, a broad definition of mottainai captured imaginations, supplementing more prosaic terms that meant waste or wasteful. The
    word mottainai, with its alleged Buddhist origins, became an umbrella term for
    waste of many different kinds, and came to appear with greater regularity than
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    14 INTRODUCTION
    rōhi (which implied a criticism of extravagance and had declined in use since the
    early postwar decades) and as frequently as muda (which connoted uselessness
    and was a conventional way to express wastefulness). At the same time, challenges
    to the purported virtue of mottainai began to appear as people reconceived their
    attachments to material things and their very sense of self. In twenty-first-century Japan, the idea of waste expanded to encompass environmental commitments, a search for individual and national identities, and attempts to define
    anew relationships with things and with time in continued pursuit of an affluence of the heart, mind, and spirit (kokoro no yutakasa). This constructive and
    forward-looking orientation should expose the laziness of continuing to extend
    with each passing year the chronological reach of the so-called “lost decades.” In
    time, we may come to better understand millennial Japan in terms of its various
    attempts at redefinition and at finding itself anew in a world of stagnant affluence.
    Bringing this history as far up to the present as possible is intended to illustrate the persistence of postwar Japan as a historical phenomenon and an analytical apparatus, but there are real challenges with writing such a contemporary
    history. It is not clear what the implications and impacts of the disasters of
    March 2011 will be, and how they will fit into the narrative arc of millennial
    Japan. Without the benefit of hindsight, it is not evident whether something like
    the new minimalism will prove to be a quickly passing trend or a phenomenon
    with lasting influence. That politicians and scholars have repeatedly declared the
    postwar over has indicated instead that there has been no unequivocal point
    of closure, and it is hard to tell a story with no apparent end. History keeps
    unfolding, sometimes in ways that contradict what was written not long ago.31
    But I would suggest that histories, perhaps especially of the modern, never really
    end and that hindsight can erase the important contingencies and ephemera of
    the past. In the case of postwar Japan, we cannot artificially truncate the period
    and claim its end because we continue to live in the postwar; there has been no
    resolution to the complicated legacies of war, defeat, and occupation; and there
    has not been a catastrophic experience on the scale of another world war to mark
    unambiguously the period’s conclusion. Nor can we wait until the period seems
    somehow over before we attempt to understand the larger stories of postwar
    Japan.
    At this present moment, many people—not unlike the fictional teenagers
    in the public service announcement about mottainai—are grappling with how
    to live in, and make sense of, a postwar Japan built on the pillars of economic
    growth, financial affluence, and mass consumption.32 This has been a struggle
    familiar in some form since the late 1950s and a defining characteristic of these
    many decades. Even as people came to marvel at the astonishing availability of
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    MEANING AND VALUE IN THE EVERYDAY 15
    products to consume and new amusements to pursue, they considered the disappointments, challenges, and unfulfilled promises of economic growth. Even as
    the country’s wealth reached levels unrivaled by most in the world, there were
    ways in which it was seen to have fallen short in the ways people lived and in their
    sense of security and fulfillment. Desires to achieve and defend the privileges of
    middle-class lifestyles made possible by affluence have existed right alongside
    discomfort and dissatisfaction with the logics, costs, and consequences of that
    very prosperity. This tension has long endured in postwar Japan, as utterly inconceivable as it would have been to people in late 1945, who could imagine little
    beyond the exigencies of daily life in the aftermath of war.
    Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Waste : Consuming Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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    Created from upenn-ebooks on 2020-04-05 13:14:54. Copyright © 2018. Cornell University Press. All rights reserved.The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 16 | Issue 15 | Number 2 | Article ID 5180 | Aug 01, 2018
    1
    Olympic Dissent: Art, Politics, and the Tokyo Olympic Games
    of 1964 and 2020
    Namiko Kunimoto
    Precis
    Through an examination of Olympic-related art
    and the gendered, labored bodies that produce
    the Olympic spectacle, “Olympic Dissent: Art,
    Politics, and the Tokyo Games” reveals
    continuities in the political and artistic stakes
    of the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964 and 2020.
    Keywords: 1964 Olympics, art and politics,
    2020 Tokyo games, national identity,
    Nakamura Hiroshi, Takayama Akira
    The 1964 Tokyo Olympiad was intended to
    confirm Japan’s role in the new world order,
    implicitly celebrating both its so-called
    economic miracle and the central place
    accorded Japan in the U.S. strategy for the
    “containment of Communism in Asia.”1
    The
    stakes of political hegemony became
    paramount, encompassing spatial, cultural, and
    national identity. Noriko Aso has cogently
    pointed out how “…culture (bunka) has served,
    as in the prewar and wartime periods, as a key
    term in postwar articulations of national
    polity.”2
    As the Tokyo Games approached, the rhetoric
    around the role of so-called “national culture”
    crystallized, and designers, art museums,
    exhibitions, and artists were mobilized in a
    manner that recalled the patriotic fervor of the
    1930s and 1940s during Japan’s 15-year war.
    Some artists, like Kamekura Yusaka, readily
    took up the Olympic cause, while other
    Japanese artists, including groups such as Hi
    Red Center were openly critical of the games.
    Nakamura Hiroshi, an artist and illustrator
    born in 1932, focused on the unequal positions
    of America and its vassal state, Japan, within
    the Cold War’s political and cultural order. This
    essay discusses Nakamura’s response to the
    1964 Tokyo Olympic games and closes with a
    brief look at contemporary artwork by
    Takayama Akira, a performance artist born in
    1969, whose work addresses the upcoming
    Tokyo 2020 Olympics in similar terms.
    Nakamura was previously a reportage painter
    affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party,
    and his resistance to the 1964 Tokyo Olympic
    Games grew from his involvement with leftwing activist groups such as the Japan Art
    Alliance and his awareness that the state was
    marshaling art to forward its liberal capitalist
    agenda. The patriotic flavor of the state’s
    Olympic rhetoric, which called on citizens to
    actively clean up their neighborhoods, fund
    lotteries to benefit the Olympics, and to
    tolerate heightened policing and intensive
    construction was distasteful to Nakamura and
    his peers.3
    Although the state sought to
    leverage the Olympics to disassociate Japan’s
    fascist, wartime identity from its postwar
    democratic and internationally-engaged
    identity, the Olympiad demonstrated many
    holdovers from the Imperial period. These
    continuities included mass mobilization, the
    promotion of a unified Japan, and, not least, the
    role of the Emperor in building Olympic
    momentum and presiding over the opening
    ceremonies.
    Nakamura used his art to emphasize the
    APJ | JF 16 | 15 | 2
    2
    continuities between the past and the present
    through color, the refiguring of Olympic motifs,
    and the representation of the steam engine.
    The young artist wished to interrogate the
    state’s heavy reliance on visual culture and, as
    his writings have shown, he believed that
    innovative art tactics, along with actions in the
    streets, were a vital means to achieve change.
    He understood the Olympics to be a key
    moment for the state to express a fully
    consolidated postwar identity, one that would
    ideally cement Japan in place as a loyal
    subordinate of American power. Nakamura also
    understood this to be a key moment to assert
    resistance to this agenda, and perhaps also to
    garner recognition as an avant-garde artist.
    The games would not only be the first in Japan,
    but the first held in Asia, (indeed in any nonWestern country). The perceived ‘symbolism of
    global comity’ would ironically render invisible
    Japan’s reconfigured postwar economic
    imperialism. Nakamura, who had been actively
    involved in the anti-ANPO movement opposed
    the state’s narrative of harmony and
    collaboration with the United States. Moreover,
    the state was keen to standardize and
    commercialize a new national identity that
    would finally escape the shadow of Japan’s
    wartime aggression and demonstrate to its own
    citizens that the deprivations they had endured
    in the 1930s and 1940s would never occur
    again. Tokyo underwent vast architectural and
    infrastructural development in preparation for
    tourists and worldwide viewing audiences, and
    trains re-emerged as a highly visible symbol of
    Japan’s new modernity, a point that Nakamura
    did not miss.
    The state was also well aware of the impact and
    import of the visual, be it art, design, and
    architecture, and invested in Olympic branding
    that would assert Japan’s leadership position in
    Asia as a peace-loving, economically powerful
    nation without reference to the power of the
    United States. Cutting-edge design teams
    organized by Japan’s Olympic committee set to
    work, rapidly creating a cohesive approach to
    symbols, pictograms, and typography that
    became a model for future Olympic design
    planning.
    Kamekura Yusaka’s Olympic emblem design
    conspicuously incorporated the red circle from
    the Japanese flag, the hinomaru, positioned
    large and bright above the Olympic rings
    (Kamekura Yusaka’s Olympic emblem design,
    1964). The image suggested the significance of
    the 1964 Olympic Games to Japan’s resurgence
    less than twenty years after the end of the
    Pacific War. According to Kamekura, the design
    was also intended to suggest movement to
    convey the kinetic feel of the Olympics, which
    simultaneously implied Japan’s upward
    mobility.4
    APJ | JF 16 | 15 | 2
    3
    Nakamura’s painting, Sacred Torch Relay, from
    1964, also engaged the image of the hinomaru,
    but in a critical manner (Nakamura Hiroshi,
    Seika senriko (Sacred Torch Relay), Oil on
    canvas, 1964, Copyright Nakamura Hiroshi,
    Courtesy of the Takamatsu City Museum of
    Art). The work was Nakamura’s contribution to
    an Olympic-themed exhibition at the Sixth
    Contemporary Art Exhibition of Japan, an
    independent exhibition sponsored by the
    Mainichi Shimbun. In this oil-on-canvas
    composition, the billowing edge of the
    hinomaru flag floats upward to reveal six steam
    locomotives, their engines emanating outward
    like cannons. Just when the state was proudly
    displaying it’s new shinkansen (bullet train)
    lines, and leaning heavily on imagery of the
    trains to promote Japan as a futuristic nation,
    Nakamura used the emblem of the steam
    locomotive as an explicitly historical and potent
    reminder of the continuities between past and
    present.
    Nakamura references Sakai Yoshinori, the boy
    born in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and
    chosen by the Olympic committee to be the
    final bearer of the torch, as a symbol of Japan’s
    ability to overcome the atomic bomb with grace
    and agility. According to Yoshikuni Igarashi,
    the media heightened this sense of recovery by
    making reference to Sakai’s aesthetically
    pleasing body and running style.5
    But in Sacred
    Torch Relay, the artist multiplies the body
    across the center of the canvas, his torso itself
    a torch, overtaken by flames, creating an eerie
    line of homogenous figures somewhat
    reminiscent of the military. Kamikaze planes
    sky-write large Olympic rings that are
    seemingly blown sideways from the force of the
    engines, again summoning the viewer to
    consider the continuities between imperial
    desire in the 1930s and 1940s and Japan’s
    nationalistic desires in the postwar period.
    Although hallmarks of celebratory patriotism
    such as the hinomaru flag, the Olympic rings,
    and the Olympic torch are clearly visible in the
    work, the image stops short of pure
    triumphalism. The flag is cut from the frame,
    billowing up and revealing a teeming group of
    abstract mechanical red forms, lending the
    painting a menacing edge. In the foreground,
    waves rush toward the frame of the painting,
    seemingly about to overtake a lone plant
    (extending from the whale’s spout) standing
    amidst the waves. Sacred Torch Relay
    repurposes recognizable Olympic motifs and
    expresses ambivalence toward the state,
    targeting Japan’s implicit nationalist
    motivations.
    Still, Nakamura later found the ambivalence he
    had expressed in Sacred Torch Relay
    APJ | JF 16 | 15 | 2
    4
    insufficient; indeed, in a recent interview he
    was rueful about not taking his 1964 critique
    further, remarking that at the time he feared
    he would not be included in the exhibition nor
    have a chance at winning any awards if he
    submitted a heavily politicized artwork.6
    Yet,
    Sacred Torch Relay and Sightseeing Empire,
    completed in 1964 (Nakamura Hiroshi, Kanko
    teikoku Sightseeing Empire, Oil on canvas,
    1964, Copyright Nakamura Hiroshi. Courtesy
    of the Yokohama Museum of Art), as I see it,
    connect the disastrous consequences of
    imperial Japan’s ambitions to the rhetoric of
    new state power embodied by the postwar
    emphasis on infrastructure and economic
    growth. In other words, his work critiques the
    ‘construction state’ dokken kokka, the sturdy
    triangular relationship between the LDP, major
    banks and construction firms that would define
    the landscape of postwar Japan.7
    Again, in this
    artwork, Nakamura opts for the steam
    locomotive, an emblem of the mechanized past,
    rich with nostalgia. The image situates
    masculinized machinery as a national emblem
    of power and disaster. Nakamura’s trains are a
    vibrant crimson, the hue of the hinomaru flag
    and his color of choice for many works in this
    period. The engines in Sightseeing Empire,
    exuding excessive amounts of red steam (the
    same color as the hinomaru), are so powerful
    they have literally gone off the rails.
    Soon after completing this painting, Nakamura
    sought other means to critique the visual
    representations of Olympic fanfare. He joined
    forces with Tateishi Koichi (born 1941), and
    founded the Sightseeing Art Research Institute
    (Kanko Geijutsu Kenkyujo). In March 1964,
    Nakamura and Tateishi (also known as Tiger
    Tateishi) began to exhibit their work outdoors.
    Moving outside the structured spaces of
    buildings offered a way for these artists to feel
    as though they were escaping the heavy hand
    of the state’s drive to coopt and control cultural
    capital. That the Sightseeing Art Research
    group began in 1964, as tourists flooded into
    Japan in unprecedented numbers for the
    Olympics, makes the organization’s titular
    irony plain. Nakamura has pointed out that
    while the term “sightseeing” conjures visions of
    fun and visual pleasure, businesses that
    promote sightseeing are, by their nature,
    concerned firstly about profit.8
    Tateishi and
    Nakamura’s use of the term “sightseeing” also
    captures the importance of vision, and they
    hoped the movement would bring about a reexamination of painting, representation, and
    viewership.
    That same year, Nakamura and Tateishi pushed
    movement and art together more forcefully by
    organizing a one-day guerrilla-style event on
    the banks of Tokyo’s Tama River, under a
    railway bridge for the Chuo Line. Tateishi had
    created a large image (approximately seven
    meters by four meters) of Mount Fuji – the
    single most powerful symbol of unified Japan –
    that was too large to display elsewhere, so the
    pair opted for an illegal site. Sam Francis,
    Yoshiaki Tohno, and other artists attended the
    event, dubbed “The First Sightseeing
    Exhibition,” in reference to Mount Fuji as an
    international tourist draw for Japan.9
    Some
    artists crossed the river to join them, wading
    through it barefoot. Once at the site, Tateishi
    and Nakamura rapidly created and then
    destroyed various artworks, thereby locating
    the art object within performative action,
    defying the cycles of visual commercialism that
    Olympic tourism brought with it.10 According to
    Nakamura, the event was meant to critique the
    notion of sightseeing: for most viewers, the
    term suggested whimsy and enjoyment, but
    Nakamura states they wanted to point out that
    sightseeing is usually an operation by tourism
    companies that are only interested in financial
    gain.11 Their actions were part of a broader
    movement to take art of out the museum and
    into the streets in the 1960s.
    The Sightseeing Art Laboratory disbanded after
    about one year, in part because the topicality of
    critiquing Japan’s Olympic fever had waned,
    and in part because Tateishi and Nakamura
    APJ | JF 16 | 15 | 2
    5
    had arrived at the limits of their common
    ground. Tateishi went on to complete artworks
    relying heavily on motifs of Japanese
    essentialized masculinity, such as the samurai
    warrior, as in Samurai, the Watcher (Koya no
    Yojinbo) (1965). It is tempting to describe his
    later work as ironic, but the art market has
    swallowed them whole, keen to embrace the
    traditional Japanese hero represented in a
    modern medium. In 1964, Artists went on to be
    involved in undocumented art activist events
    like NOlympic held at Hijikata Tetsumi’s
    Asbestos Hall, but by 1970, Nakamura’s belief
    in the ability of artists to step outside the
    system he wished to critique had also been
    tempered:
    I think that anything we call
    artwork can never escape from
    “the museum.” So that means our
    life itself cannot escape from the
    state or from class relationships.
    Oh, damn it! (aaa, iyada! iyada!).
    Even if a piece of art does escape
    from “the museum,” outside,
    another “museum” awaits – the
    state. Then, escaping from the
    museum only means getting closer
    to the state.12
    With the 2020 Games on the horizon, Japan’s
    stakes have shifted but much remains the
    same. Rather than celebrating its emergence as
    a world power, Japan’s leaders aspire to prove
    it is still a leading economy, despite lackluster
    growth in the post-bubble years of the 1990s
    and 2000s and the surging Chinese economy
    replacing Japan as the second largest economy
    and leading trading nation. A younger
    generation of artists has begun to critique
    anew the state’s embrace of capitalism and its
    disregard for economic inequality. Artists such
    as Takayama Akira have created performance
    art and installations that critically engage with
    the use of athletic and laboring bodies for the
    benefit of state development.
    Takayama Akira founded “Port B,” an
    experimental theatre company, and organized
    an event called Tokyo/Olympic in 2007. (The
    company is named after the Spanish border
    town where Walter Benjamin, 1892–1940,
    ended his life). For his first Port B project,
    Takayama gathered a group of 30 volunteers in
    the Sugamo Jizo-dori shopping district,
    chartered a Hato tour bus, and spent a half day
    crisscrossing the city to visit places that were
    established for the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games,
    including Yoyogi National Stadium and the
    Budokan. The theatrical work featured actress
    Neko Akiko, posing as tour guide, as the bus
    made its way around the city, reproducing the
    performative, spatial, and durational
    characteristics of a typical Japanese
    sightseeing tour bus. Instead of a nostalgic
    tour, participant Ozaki Tetsuya said, “the tour
    aimed to dissect images, sensations and
    experiences from the ‘high times’ of the 1960s
    and reconnect them with the present globalised
    cityscape of wider Tokyo.”
    Gathering in front of Yoyogi National Stadium,
    an iconic Olympic site designed by Tange
    Kenzo (1913—2005), the audience was
    presented with the first of several
    commemorative photographs taken by a roving
    photographer with a telephoto lens. Other
    aspects of the tour were more disruptive; for
    example, while walking down Takeshita-dori in
    Harajuku, the group listened to recorded
    interviews of workers on the strip, many of
    them undocumented workers, conveying
    concerns about personal security and anxiety
    about the future. Participants also experienced
    a demonstration explaining how tour guides
    were trained to stand and present to audiences:
    one foot strategically placed, tucked behind
    and at 45 degrees to the other, a ballet position
    emphasizing decorum and idealized femininity.
    These kinds of deconstructive activities raised
    critical awareness about the ways the Olympics
    marshalled bodies in the past and the ways it
    will do so in the future.13
    APJ | JF 16 | 15 | 2
    6
    In an installation work displayed in 2016 at the
    Mori Art Museum, Takayama took a different
    tactic, this time drawing viewers into the
    complex relations between bodies and Olympic
    building (Takayama Akira, Babel: The City and
    its Towers (detail), 2016, Published in My Body,
    Your Voice: Roppongi Crossing 2016, (Tokyo:
    Mori Museum of Art, 2016), 48-9. Copyright
    Takayama Akira). In his piece Babel: The City
    and its Towers, Takayama projects video
    interviews with two elderly men: one is the
    founder of a lucrative construction company,
    who previously participated in planning some
    of the high-rise buildings in down town Tokyo
    in the 1960s, while the other man is a migrant
    day-laborer from Niigata, who worked
    construction in Tokyo during the period leading
    up to the 1964 Games.
    Sitting in his makeshift home, sporting an
    Oakland Raiders cap, and surrounded by
    Doraemon toys and misplaced umbrellas, the
    worker known as “Makoto” describes being a
    scaffolder during the intense period of
    construction leading up the 1964 games. Now,
    he says, they are cleaning up the city for the
    next Olympic Games, and he will have nowhere
    to live.
    On the other side of the wall, separate video
    projections display life-sized images of four
    migrant workers from Iran, Ghana, Turkey, and
    Vietnam, posing in front of the construction site
    for the 2020 Olympic Games (Figure 5,
    Takayama Akira, Babel: The City and its Towers
    (detail), 2016, Published in My Body, Your
    Voice: Roppongi Crossing 2016, (Tokyo: Mori
    Museum of Art, 2016), 48-9. Copyright
    Takayama Akira). In a voice-over, they tell
    folktales about building towers in their
    respective native languages. The same story is
    simultaneously voiced over in Japanese and
    transcribed in English. The blend of the voices
    enacts the titular reference to the story of
    Babel, wherein God is angered by their
    hubristic tower-building and confounds their
    common language. In Takayama’s video art,
    after each person speaks, their bodies
    gradually become indistinguishable from the
    white around them, rendering them invisible,
    much like the invisible labor they have
    performed to create the next Tokyo Olympic
    spectacle.
    Takayama’s dissent speaks in urgent tones
    about the exacting toll on human bodies,
    making clear that it is those most vulnerable, in
    terms of class and race, who must make the
    greatest sacrifices for the nationalist spectacle
    of the Olympics.
    As the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games draw closer,
    another No Olympics group, referencing the
    APJ | JF 16 | 15 | 2
    7
    1964 name, has organized numerous political
    events. The anti-Olympic Arts Council Tokyo
    renames the Olympics “Festivals of
    Repression.” Takayama is an active member of
    the group. In conclusion, both Nakamura’s and
    Takayama’s artworks call direct visual
    attention to the infrastructure of the Olympics
    and the national and/or imperial desires that
    foster Olympic development. They make similar
    points, although perhaps Takayama pays closer
    attention to the human costs of Olympic
    spectacle. Though Takayama too may
    encounter an exasperating inability to escape
    Japan’s tight state-capital nexus, his voice and
    vision will be added to Nakamura’s and others
    of the postwar generation, encouraging critical
    engagement and solidarity in the arts and
    beyond.
    Related articles
    Alexander Brown and Vera
    Mackie, Introduction: Art and Activism in
    Post-Disaster Japan はじめに 災害後の日本
    における アート と アクティビズム
    (https://apjjf.org/2015/13/6/Vera-Mackie/42
    77.html)
    Allison Holland, Natural Disaster, Trauma
    and Activism in the Art of Takamine
    Tadasu 高峯挌のアートにおける自然災害、トラ
    ウマ、アクティビズム
    (https://apjjf.org/2015/13/6/Allison-Holland
    /4282.html)
    Linda Hoaglund, Protest Art in 1950s
    Japan: The Forgotten Reportage Painters
    抗議する美術 忘れられた1950代日本のルポル
    タージュ 画 家
    (https://apjjf.org/2014/12/43/Linda-Hoaglu
    nd/4203.html)
    Christopher Gerteis, Political Protest in
    Interwar Japan–Part II 戦間期日本の政治的抗
    議活動 (下 )
    (https://apjjf.org/2014/12/37/Christopher-G
    erteis/4179/article.html)
    Namiko Kunimoto
    (https://apjjf.org/admin/staff_manage/details/%20https:/osu.academia.edu/NamikoKunimoto)
    is associate professor of modern and contemporary Japanese art at Ohio State University and
    author of The Stakes of Exposure: Anxious Bodies in Postwar Japanese Art (University of
    Minnesota Press, 2017).
    Notes
    1 Noriko Aso, “Sumptuous Re-past: The 1964 Tokyo Olympics Arts Festival” positions: east
    asia cultures critique, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 14.
    2 Noriko Aso, “Sumptuous Re-past: The 1964 Tokyo Olympics Arts Festival” positions: east
    asia cultures critique, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 10.
    3 Noriko Aso, “Sumptuous Re-past: The 1964 Tokyo Olympics Arts Festival” positions: east
    asia cultures critique, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 15.
    4 National Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo, Design Project for the Tokyo 1964 Olympic Games
    (Tokyo: National Museum of Modern Art, 2013), 122.
    5
    Yoshikuni Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture,
    APJ | JF 16 | 15 | 2
    8
    1945-1970 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 153-55.
    6
    Author interview with the artist at Fuma Contemporary, Tokyo, May 23, 2017.
    7
    For more on the construction state in Japan, see Gavan McCormack, The Emptiness of
    Japanese Affluence, Japan in the Modern World (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Thomas
    Feldhoff, “Japan’s Construction Lobby Activities – Systemic Stability and Sustainable Regional
    Development,” ASIEN 84 (January 1, 2002).
    8
    Author interview with Yoshiko Shimada and the artist at Fuma Contemporary, Tokyo, May
    23, 2017.
    9
    Fujieda Teruo, “Painting After the End of the Avant-Garde” From Postwar to Postmodern:
    Primary Documents, (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2012), editor’s notes, Note 1,
    page 305.
    10 As a result, the works are no longer extant and cannot be included in this essay.
    11 Author interview with Nakamura Hiroshi, Tokyo, May 23, 2016.
    12 Nakamura Hiroshi, “Akasegawa Genpei: A Proletariat with an Object” in Kagaisha(Tokyo:
    Bijutsu Shuppansha, 2003), 147.
    13 For more on this, see Kyoko Iwaki, “The Politics of the Senses: Takayama Akira’s atomized
    theatre after Fukushima” in eds. Barbara Geilhorn and Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt,
    Fukushima and the arts: negotiating nuclear disaster (London: New York : Routledge, 2017),
    199-220.
  • The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 17 | Issue 5 | Number 3 | Article ID 5256 | Mar 01, 2019
    1
    The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the Tokyo Olympics
    Koide Hiroaki
    Norma Field, Translation, Introduction and Notes
    Introduction: “No One Who Is Alive Today
    …”An introduction to “The Fukushima
    Nuclear Disaster and the Tokyo Olympics”
    Norma Field
    To the question, when did you decide to commit
    to the abolition of nuclear power, Koide Hiroaki
    replies without hesitation, “October 23,
    1970.”1
    It was March 2015 when Koide retired
    as assistant professor from the Kyoto
    University Research Reactor Institute. If we
    add together the lead-up to that decision and
    his activities following retirement, we come up
    with a half-century of dedication to the cause of
    stopping the nuclear generation of electricity, a
    keystone of postwar national policy.
    Koide Hiroaki, Matsumoto, July 2018
    How is it that Koide can point so precisely to
    that date, to any date? At the time, he was in
    his third year in the nuclear engineering
    department of Tohoku University. In
    adolescence, geology had been his passion. He
    was the head of his high school club even in his
    senior year, when it would have been
    commonsensical to dedicate every hour to
    preparing for university entrance exams. (To
    that endeavor he conceded a scant month or so,
    the January of the year he would matriculate in
    April.) Walking mountain trails, noting the
    things that geologists study, was the expression
    of an individual, a personal, love. At university,
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    2
    he was determined to do something beneficial
    to society. Like many youths with scientific
    leanings, Koide dedicated himself to the dream
    of “peaceful uses of atomic energy.”2
    Tellingly,
    it was only the former imperial universities that
    offered programs in nuclear engineering. For
    someone who hated hot weather, the only
    options pointed north, to Hokkaido and Tohoku.
    As campuses exploded in the 1968-69 student
    movement, Koide attended his classes still
    wearing the student uniform—black, buttoned
    to standup collar—already cast off by most
    college students. Disliking politics, a position
    he asserts to this day,3
    he nevertheless took the
    trouble to try to understand the point of the
    student movement. His conclusion: to
    understand the social significance of one’s field
    of study and to assume responsibility for it.
    He found, close at hand, a site where he could
    immediately put this recognition into practice.
    In 1968, Tohoku Electric Power Company
    (Tepco) decided to site a nuclear power plant in
    Onagawa, Miyagi Prefecture, a fishing village
    that barely used electricity. Why, Koide puzzled
    along with the villagers, would such a project
    not be sited in the metropolis of Sendai, where
    company headquarters were located? He
    searched for the answer, which he
    subsequently understood was glaringly
    obvious: while the electricity generated by
    nuclear power plants was desirable for large
    cities, their operation posed too great a risk
    and therefore necessitated remote
    siting.4
    (Recall that the Fukushima nuclear
    power stations of Tepco functioned solely to
    produce electricity for Tokyo.) He listened to
    the villagers and argued with the professors
    who promoted nuclear power. October 23,
    1970 was the day of the first large gathering of
    the Alliance Resolved to Oppose the Onagawa
    Nuclear Power Plant (Onagawa Gempatsu
    Hantai Kisei Dōmei). Koide began to split his
    life between Sendai, where Tohoku University
    was located, and Onagawa. He and fellow
    carless comrades walked the hamlets of the
    area, handing out flyers, talking with lonely
    seniors but also jumping into pits dug by power
    shovels in order to delay construction. When
    arrests were made, they launched the first
    lawsuit in Japan to challenge the safety of
    nuclear power.
    Koide’s direct connection with Onagawa ended
    in 1974, when he entered the Kyoto University
    Reactor Research Institute.5
    There, he would
    come to have five like-minded colleagues who
    would be critically and then popularly known as
    the “Kumatori Gang of Six” (Kumatori
    Rokuningumi). The “gang” portion was meant
    to invoke the “Gang of Four,” leaders of China’s
    Cultural Revolution, later considered
    “treasonous” and imprisoned, just as these
    nuclear scientists were frequently presented by
    their critics as traitors to their mission;
    “Kumatori” refers to the location of the
    Institute in Osaka Prefecture, inconvenient to
    access, far from Kyoto University, which itself
    attests to community displeasure over the
    prospect of living near a nuclear reactor, even
    a research reactor.6
    These scientists dedicated
    their expertise to making the dangers of
    nuclear power understandable to the general
    public. They were, understandably,
    distinctive—a presence apart from the
    academic world of promotions and lavish
    grants. Yet Koide has repeatedly denied that he
    was subject to any pressure: his speciality at
    the Institute was radiation measurement, and
    as part of the Nuclear Safety Research Group,
    he was tasked with overseeing the disposal of
    radioactive waste, including effluent. So long
    as he responsibly fulfilled his official
    obligations, he was free to pursue whatever
    research and activities he chose, including the
    antinuclear work with his colleagues. This, he
    said, was possible because it was not Tokyo
    University that he worked for, but Kyoto, with
    its tradition of emphasis on basic research and
    respect for the individual researcher. Retiring
    in 2015 at the lowest academic rung—in other
    words, not having anyone under him—also
    suited his inclinations.7
    Moving to Matsumoto
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    3
    City in Nagano Prefecture, he has cut back on
    the punishing schedule he maintained after
    March 11, 2011, but continues to participate in
    those activities to which he feels he can make a
    contribution, mostly in the form of lecturing
    and writing. As a citizen committed to opposing
    war, he stands on the third day of every month
    in front of Matsumoto Station carrying a poster
    with the words, “We say ‘no!’ to Abe politics”
    (Abe seiji o yurusanai).
    It stands to reason that Koide should be asked
    to address the matter of the 2020 Tokyo
    Olympics. In his Buenos Aires speech on
    September 7, 2013, two years and four months
    after the start of the Fukushima disaster, Prime
    Minister Abe proclaimed to the International
    Olympic Committee that the situation was
    “under control,” that the Fukushima accident
    had “never done and never [would] do any
    damage to Tokyo.”8
    Abe’s statement was
    decisive in bringing the games to Tokyo for the
    first time since 1964, even though his
    elaboration in a subsequent press conference
    that contaminated waters were confined to the
    .3 square kilometers of the harbor created
    consternation for none other than Tepco: it had
    admitted to tank leaks only recently, in late
    August. A silt fence, it felt compelled to explain,
    could not perfectly keep the contaminated
    water within the harbor.9
    Such quibbles aside, we might pause over
    predictions that the 2020 Olympics-Paralympics
    may end up costing 3 trillion yen
    (approximately 26.4 billion USD), many times
    the original budget for what was promised to
    be the most “compact Olympics” ever.10 These
    games are often touted as the “recovery
    Olympics” (fukkō gorin). It is not hard to
    conjure ways that these monies might have
    been used to benefit the entire region afflicted
    by the triple disaster and especially, the victims
    of the enduring nuclear disaster. A pittance of
    the Olympics budget would have sustained
    modest housing support for evacuees,
    compulsory or “voluntary.” Instead, the highly
    restricted, arbitrarily drawn evacuation zones
    have been recklessly opened for return of
    evacuated citizens despite worrisome
    conditions prevailing over wide swaths of the
    region. The J-Village soccer center, which had
    served as a base for disaster workers, where
    they slept, donned protective gear, and were
    screened, are scheduled to become the training
    site for the national soccer team, with hopes
    that others might follow suit. It has even been
    proposed as the starting point for the Olympic
    torch relay. One baseball and six softball games
    are to be held in Fukushima City.
    Aerial view of temporary storage site for
    flexible container bags containing soil
    from decontamination. Hōrai District,
    Fukushima City, April 2018.
    Making Invisible the Visible Artifacts of
    Invisible Radioactive Contamination
    Radioactivity is invisible, but the decision to
    have people live with it has produced an
    unsettling crop of white cylindrical “monitoring
    posts
    (https://www.google.com/search?q=%E7%A6%
    8F%E5%B3%B6%E3%80%80%E3%83%A2%E3
    %83%8B%E3%82%BF%E3%83%AA%E3%83%
    B3%E3%82%B0%E3%83%9D%E3%82%B9%E3
    %83%88%E3%80%80%E7%94%BB%E5%83%8
    F&tbm=isch&tbs=rimg:CfCbY0TUum1Ijjzxgm0nsMSvYKMpd3_1dY_1s1ob
    Q8G8OaRb4UrU63GdbcfZ_1Ou4hTRxZ3x3jR7g
    a61XRg1pUzk7YfioSCfPGCbSewxK9EZqOuILty
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    4
    raBKhIJgoyl3f91jwR2DaqAFeE9DUqEgnWhtDwbw5pFhEdy0KG
    FWnjACoSCfhStTrcZ1txEdefUGEC10-
    tKhIJ9n867iFNHFkREVN65UGrTBsqEgnfHeN
    HuBrrVRHiiPysOuHw6ioSCdGDWlTOTthEYJt9Ieng0em&tbo=u&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjF
    4_DgjfvfAhWo54MKHXR7CK0Q9C96BAgBEBs
    &biw=1745&bih=582&dpr=1.1#imgrc=jHDkB
    dmBMFOApM:)” to measure its presence in the
    air and unsightly banks of “flexible container
    bags
    (https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C5CHFA
    _enUS766US766&q=%E3%83%95%E3%83%A
    C%E3%82%B3%E3%83%B3%E3%83%90%E3
    %83%83%E3%82%B0+%E7%A6%8F%E5%B3
    %B6%E3%80%80%E7%94%BB%E5%83%8F&t
    bm=isch&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi
    3z8_d_MjgAhVD74MKHT03AoIQsAR6BAgEEAE
    &biw=1152&bih=529) ” filled with
    contaminated yard waste and soil. Both are
    awkward for Olympic hosts. The Nuclear
    Regulation Authority (NRA) is moving toward
    removal
    (https://jfissures.wordpress.com/2018/06/14/fuk
    ushima-monitoringpost/?blogsub=confirming#blog_subscription-4
    ) of the posts. Fukushima City, scheduled for
    several events, has prepared a temporary
    storage site within its perimeters. The green
    mass in the center likely represents five rows of
    bags covered with a heavy plastic sheet. The
    smaller black masses will eventually be covered
    wih the same green wrap when their blocks are
    filled.
    Source
    (http://www.tazawa.jp.net/kokushyashin01.html
    )
    In the meanwhile, French prosecutors have
    indicted the head of the Japanese Olympic
    Committee on corruption charges over the
    bidding process. 1 1 A nuclear physicist
    influential with policy makers has been found
    to have underestimated citizen exposure by a
    factor of three.12 Dr. Yamashita Shinichi,
    prefectural health adviser, who ten days after
    the disaster was assuring the people of
    Fukushima not to worry, that people who kept
    smiling would not be affected by radiaton, was
    as the same time telling experts that he
    believed there was reason for serious concern
    about child thyroid cancer.13 In April 2011, Dr.
    Akashi Makoto, then director of the National
    Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS),
    advised the prime minister’s office that there
    was no need to conduct epidemiological studies
    in anticipation of thyroid cancer risk.14 In other
    words, we are beginning to have evidence that,
    from the earliest days of the disaster,
    responsible authorities made a concerted effort
    not only to deny the possibility of health effects
    from exposure, but to prevent or at least
    minimize the creation of potentially
    inconvenient records. As medical journalist
    Aihara Hiroko observes with not a little irony,
    “Surely the Tokyo Olympics will be a superb
    occasion for displaying ‘recovery from
    disaster,’” but also for revealing to the
    international community the “real
    consequences of the human-made disaster
    resulting from the national nuclear energy
    policy: the imposition of long-term evacuation
    and sacrifice on the part of area residents.”15
    Should foreign visitors fail to see through the
    Potemkin Village that will be the 2020 Tokyo
    Olympics, however, they will not be exempt
    from the grave implications of their
    participation, spelled out by Koide Hiroaki in
    the essay that follows: “The Tokyo Olympics
    will take place in a state of nuclear emergency.
    Those countries and the people who participate
    will, on the one hand, themselves risk
    exposure, and, on the other, become
    accomplices to the crimes of this nation.”
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    5
    Tokyo 2020 Olympics/Paralympics Mascots
    Miraitowa (“future” + “eternity”), the official
    mascot for the Tokyo Olympics, is said to be
    both traditional and innovative, “with a strong
    sense of justice” and also “athletic.”
    Someity (a variety of cherry blossom evocative
    of the phrase “so mighty”), the official mascot
    for the Tokyo Paralympics, is “usually quiet but
    can demonstrate great power,” nature-loving
    with a “dignified inner strength.”
    Source
    (https://tokyo2020.org/en/special/mascot/)
    The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the
    Tokyo Olympics
    Koide Hiroaki
    The original Japanese text is available here
    (http://www.apjjf.org/2019/05/Koide-Field-Tran
    slation.html).
    What was the Fukushima Nuclear
    Accident?
    On March 11, 20011, the Tokyo Electric
    Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was
    assaulted by a severe earthquake and tsunami,
    leading to a total power outage. Experts had
    been agreed that total outage would be the
    likeliest cause of a catastrophic incident. And
    just as anticipated, the reactors of the
    Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
    suffered meltdowns and released enormous
    quantities of radioactive materials into the
    surrounding environment. According to the
    report submitted by the Japanese government
    to the International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA), this accident released 1.5×1016
    becquerels (Bq) of cesium 137 into the
    atmosphere—the equivalent of 168 Hiroshima
    bombs. One Hiroshima bomb’s worth of
    radioactivity is already terrifying, but we have
    the Japanese government acknowledging that
    the Fukushima disaster released 168 times the
    radioactivity of that explosion into the
    atmosphere.a
    The cores of reactors 1, 2, and 3 melted down.
    The amount of cesium 137 contained in those
    cores adds up to 7×10^17 Bq, or 8000
    Hiroshima bombs’ worth. Of that total, the
    amount released into the atmosphere was the
    equivalent of 168 bombs, and combined with
    releases into the sea, the total release of
    cesium 137 into the environment to date must
    be approximately equivalent to 1000 Hiroshima
    bombs. In other words, most of the radioactive
    material in those cores remains in the damaged
    reactor buildings. If the cores were to melt any
    further, there would be more releases into the
    environment. It is in order to prevent this that
    even now, nearly 8 years after the accident,
    water continues to be aimed by guesswork in
    the direction where the cores might be located.
    And because of this, several hundred tons of
    contaminated waste water are accumulating
    each day. Tokyo Electric Power Company
    (Tepco) has constructed over 1000 tanks on
    site to store this water, but the total volume
    now exceeds one million tons. Space is limited,
    and there is a limit as well to the number of
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    6
    tanks that can be constructed. Tepco will be
    compelled to release these waters into the sea
    in the near future.
    Obstacles to containing the disaster
    Of course, the greatest priority is to secure the
    melted cores in as safe a condition as possible,
    but even with the passage of nearly eight years,
    neither their location nor their condition has
    been ascertained.b
    The reason is that it is
    impossible to access those sites. Had this
    accident occurred at a thermal power plant, the
    problem would have been simple. In the
    beginning, there might have been fires burning
    over several days, but once they died down, it
    would have been possible to go to the site,
    investigate, repair, and restart operations. In
    the case of a nuclear power plant, however,
    anyone approaching the site would die. The
    government and Tepco have attempted to send
    in robots, but robots do not stand up well to
    radiation. The reason is that once their
    microchips are exposed, their programs get
    rewritten. Accordingly, almost all the robots
    sent in to date have failed to return.
    Reactor 2 Interior Probe, Fukushima
    Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
    1. Reactor pressure vessel
    2. Melted fuel debris?
    3. Tubing attached to camera
    4. Primary containment vessel
    “The melted core has fallen through the
    pedestal and out of the reactor pressure vessel.
    It cannot be retrieved. One hundred years from
    now, this accident will still not have been
    contained.”
    -Koide Hiroaki
    Source
    (https://twitter.com/asahi_designbu/status/8273
    35808931606528)
    Toward the end of January 2017, Tepco
    inserted a device resembling a remotecontrolled endoscope into the concrete
    platform (pedestal) under the reactor pressure
    vessel. A large hole that had opened up in the
    steel scaffolding used by workers during
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    7
    maintenance, located directly under the
    pressure vessel, made it possible to ascertain
    the following: the fuel core had melted through
    the pressure vessel and fallen further down.
    The investigation yielded something even more
    important, however. For human beings,
    exposure to 8 sieverts (Sv) will result in certain
    death. The area directly under the pressure
    vessel measured 20 Sv/hour, but along the way,
    levels as high as 530 or 650 Sv were detected.
    These measurements, moreover, were found
    not inside the cylindrical pedestal, but between
    the wall of the pedestal and the wall of the
    containment structure. Tepco and the
    government had scripted a scenario wherein
    most of the melted core had been deposited,
    dumpling-like, inside the pedestal, to be
    retrieved and sealed inside a containment
    structure in the course of 30-40 years.
    According to this scenario, the conclusion of
    this process would signify the achievement of
    containment. In reality, however, the melted
    nuclear fuel had flowed out of the pedestal and
    scattered all around. Forced to rewrite their
    “roadmap,” the government and Tepco began
    talking about making an opening on the side of
    the containment structure through which the
    melted fuel could be grasped and removed.
    That, however, is an impossibility. It would
    entail severe worker exposure.c
    From the beginning, I have maintained that the
    only option is to construct a sarcophagus,
    covering the plant, as was done at the
    Chernobyl site in the former Soviet Union. That
    sarcophagus deteriorated to such an extent in
    30 years’ time as to require coverage by a
    second sarcophagus, put in place in November
    2016. The second sarcophagus is expected to
    last for 100 years. We do not yet know what
    measures will be available at that point. No one
    who is alive today can expect to see the
    containment of the Chernobyl disaster. All the
    more so in the case of Fukushima: the
    containment of this disaster will not have been
    achieved even after all who are alive today
    have died. Moreover, even if it were
    hypothetically possible to seal the molten core
    inside the containment structure, that will not
    mean that the radioactivity will have vanished.
    Indeed, it would be necessary to protect any
    such structure for hundreds of thousands to a
    million years.
    Imaging the aerial method of fuel debris
    retrieval at Fukushima Daiichi
    “[Having determined that the flooding method
    of debris retrieval would be too difficult, Tepco]
    has been driven to propose an “aerial method”
    wherein the reactor core that had melted
    through the pressure vessel would be retrieved
    through a hole drilled into the side of the
    containment vessel. That, however, would
    necessitate enormous amounts of exposure.”
    -Koide Hiroaki
    1. Reactor pressure vessel
    2. Primary containment vessel
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    8
    3. Melted-through nuclear fuel (debris)
    a. Water flooding method of retrieval
    rejected
    b. Remotely controlled drills and lasers to
    scrape off debris bit by bit under
    continuous spray of water
    Source
    (http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/201
    7/08/post_15296.html)
    Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency: The
    human consequences
    Tragedy continues to unfold in the environs of
    the plant. On the day of the disaster, the
    government issued a Declaration of a Nuclear
    Emergency, and mandatory evacuation zones
    were expanded, beginning at 3 kilometers from
    the plant, then 10, then 20. Residents in those
    areas had to leave their homes, taking only
    what they could carry. Livestock and pets were
    abandoned. That is not all. Iitate Village,
    located 40-50 kilometers away from Fukushima
    Daiichi, received no warnings or instructions
    immediately after the accident, but one month
    later, because of extreme contamination, the
    entire village was ordered to evacuate.
    What do we mean when we talk about
    happiness? For many people, happiness likely
    supposes uneventful days, one unfolding after
    the other, in the company of family, friends,
    neighbors, lovers. This is what was ruptured,
    one day, without warning. Evacuees first went
    to centers, such as gymnasiums, then to
    cramped temporary housing, then to
    “reconstruction” housing or public housing
    temporarily “declared” to be evacuee quarters.
    Family members with shared lives until then
    were scattered apart. Their livelihood
    destroyed, people have been taking their own
    lives out of despair.
    This is not all. Even outside the mandatory
    evacuation zones, there emerged vast
    contaminated areas that by all rights should
    have been designated “radiation control
    zones.”d
    These are areas where only radiation
    workers, those who earn their living by
    handling radiation, are permitted entry. And
    even those workers, once they enter a control
    zone, are not permitted to drink water or eat
    food. Naturally, it is forbidden to sleep. There
    are no toilets. The government, on the grounds
    that an emergency situation prevails, has
    scrapped the usual regulations and abandoned
    several million people to live in contaminated
    areas. These people, including infants, drink
    the water, eat, and sleep in those areas. They
    have of course been burdened with the risks
    associated with exposure. And thus abandoned,
    they are all surely subject to anxiety. Some,
    seeking to avoid exposure, gave up their jobs
    and evacuated with their entire families.
    Others, wishing to protect at least their
    children from exposure, have split up, with
    fathers staying behind to pursue their jobs in
    contaminated areas and mothers leaving with
    their children. But this has damaged household
    stability and wrecked family relationships.
    Staying in contaminated areas hurts the body,
    but evacuation crushes the soul. These
    abandoned people have been living in anguish
    every day for nearly eight years.
    On top of this, in March of 2017, the
    government instructed those it had once
    ordered to leave, or those who had left of their
    own volition, to return to those contaminated
    areas so long as the radiation levels did not
    exceed 20 millisieverts/year (mSv). The housing
    assistance it had offered these people, however
    unsatisfactory, was terminated. This has
    inevitably meant that some people are forced to
    return. In Fukushima today, reconstruction is
    considered the highest priority. If people feel
    no choice but to live there, then of course,
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    9
    reconstruction becomes desirable. They cannot
    tolerate living in fear day after day. They would
    like to forget about the contamination, and
    fortunately or not, radioactivity is invisible. The
    central and local governments take active
    measures to make them forget. Anyone voicing
    concern or referring to contamination is subject
    to criticism: they are obstructing
    reconstruction.
    20 mSv per year is the level of exposure
    permitted only for radiation workers, such as I
    once was. It is hard to forgive the fact that this
    level is now being imposed on people who
    derive no benefit from exposure. Moreover,
    infants and children, who are especially
    sensitive to radiation, have no responsibility for
    the recklessness of Japanese nuclear policy, let
    alone for the Fukushima disaster. It is not
    permissible to apply occupational levels of
    exposure to them. The government of Japan,
    however, says nothing can be done given the
    Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency. We can
    understand an emergency lasting for one day, a
    whole week, one month, or depending on the
    circumstances, even for one year. But in fact,
    the Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency has
    not been rescinded even after nearly eight
    years have passed. The government is eager to
    make people forget about the Fukushima
    disaster. Media have fallen silent. Most
    Japanese have been driven to forget that
    conditions are such that make it impossible to
    rescind the Declaration even while the
    regulations that should prevail have been
    scrapped. The principal culprit in radioactive
    contamination is cesium 137, with a half-life of
    30 years. Even after the passage of 100 years,
    it will have diminished by only one-tenth. In
    point of fact, even after 100 years, Japan will be
    in a state of nuclear emergency.
    Holding the Olympic Games in a state of
    nuclear emergency
    The Olympic games have always been used to
    display national might. In recent years, they
    have become tools for businesses, especially
    construction companies, which create, and then
    destroy, large public structures, leading to a
    colossally wasteful society from which they
    derive stupendous profit. What is important
    now is for the state to mobilize all its resources
    so that the Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency
    can be rescinded as soon as possible. The
    priority should be to give relief to those who
    continue to suffer from the Fukushima nuclear
    disaster, and at the very least, to protect
    children, who are blameless, from exposure.
    The greater the risks facing a society, the more
    those in power seek to avert peoples’ eyes. The
    mass media will try to whip up Olympic fever,
    and there will come a time when those who
    oppose the Olympics will be denounced as
    traitors. So it was during World War II: the
    media broadcast only the proclamations from
    Imperial Headquarters, and virtually all citizens
    cooperated in the war effort. The more you
    thought yourself an upstanding Japanese, the
    more likely you were to condemn your fellow
    citizens as traitors. If, however, this is a
    country that chooses to prioritize the Olympic
    games over the blameless citizens it has
    abandoned, then I shall gladly become a traitor.
    The Fukushima disaster will proceed in 100-
    year increments, freighted with enormous
    tragedies. Casting sidelong glances at the vast
    numbers of victims, the perpetrators, including
    Tepco, government officials, scholars, and the
    media, have utterly failed to take responsibility.
    Not a single one has been punished.e
    Taking
    advantage of this, they are trying to restart the
    reactors that are currently stopped and to
    export them overseas. The Tokyo Olympics will
    take place in a state of nuclear emergency.
    Those countries and the people who participate
    will, on the one hand, themselves risk
    exposure, and, on the other, become
    accomplices to the crimes of this nation.
    August 23, 2018
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    10
    Translation Notes:
    a. Cesium 137, with a half-life of approximately
    30 years, is a major source of long-term
    contamination after atmospheric nuclear
    weapons tests and nuclear power plant
    accidents. It has been the principal
    radionuclide of concern in Fukushima. The
    comparative calculation given here is based on
    Fukushima estimates released by the Japanese
    Government in its June 2011 “Report by the
    Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial
    Conference on Nuclear Safety—The Accident at
    TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations”
    (see here
    (https://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/topics/201106/pd
    f/coverev_sheet.pdf) for whole report with links
    to subsequent revisions and here
    (http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/topics/201106/pdf
    /chapter_vi.pdf) for Chapter VI, “Discharge of
    Radioactive Materials to the Environment”),.
    The information on releases appears in table
    form as part of an August 26, 2011 Ministry of
    Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) “News
    Release” on “Tokyo Denryoku Kabushikigaisha
    Fukushima Daiichi Genshiryoku Hatsudensho
    oyobi Hiroshima ni tōka sareta genshibakudan
    kara hōshutsu sareta hōshaseibushutsu ni
    kansuru shisanchi ni tsuite” [On the estimates
    of radioactive materials released by Tokyo
    Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi
    Nuclear Power Station and the atomic bomb
    dropped on Hiroshima] (see here
    (http://www.crms-jpn.org/doc/%E8%A7%A3%E
    6%9E%90%E3%81%A7%E5%AF%BE%E8%B1
    %A1%E3%81%A8%E3%81%97%E3%81%9F%E
    6%9C%9F%E9%96%93%E3%81%A7%E3%81%
    AE%E5%A4%A7%E6%B0%97%E4%B8%AD%E
    3%81%B8%E3%81%AE%E6%94%BE%E5%B0
    %84%E6%80%A7%E7%89%A9%E8%B3%AA%
    E3%81%AE%E6%94%BE%E5%87%BA%E9%87
    %8F%E3%81%AE%E8%A9%A6%E7%AE%97%
    E5%80%A4%EF%BC%88Bq).pdf)). For its
    estimates of radionuclides released into the
    atmosphere by the Hiroshima bomb, this report
    cites the UNSCEAR [United Nations Scientific
    Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation]
    2000 Report to the General Assembly with
    Scientific Annexes: “Sources and Effects of
    Ionizing Radiation,” Annex C
    (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/12/26
    /national/crime-legal/5-year-jail-terms-soughtex-tepco-execs-nuclearcrisis/#.XG2NbZNKiqA), “Exposures to the
    Public from Man-made Sources of Radiation.”
    The reference is surely to Table 9 (p. 213),
    “Radionuclides produced and globally
    dispersed in atmospheric nuclear testing,”
    wherein the radionuclides are listed in identical
    order as the METI chart on Hiroshima, minus,
    of course, plutonium 239, 240, and 241 (the
    Hiroshima bomb, unlike Nagasaki, was a
    uranium weapon).
    b. On 13 February 2019, Tepco released photos
    showing first contact with melted fuel debris in
    unit 2. See here
    (http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Te
    pco-makes-contact-with-melted-fuel-in-unit-2).
    c. See “Important Stories of Decommissioning
    2018
    (http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nucl
    ear/decommissioning/pdf/20180827_roadmap.p
    df)” by the Agency for Natural Resources and
    Energy, METI, for the government account of
    the roadmap, especially pages 20-24 on fuel
    retrieval.
    d. Standards for such designation vary from
    country to country and within agencies of a
    given country. Koide’s discussion here is based
    on the standard of 40,000 Bq/m2
    as the
    threshold of contamination, above which an
    area should be designated a control zone
    according to Japanese law.
    e. There are currently more than 30 civil cases
    winding their way through the courts, but only
    one criminal proceeding in Tokyo District
    Course, with three former Tepco executives as
    defendants, charged with professional
    negligence resulting in death and injury. Since
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    11
    public prosecutors had twice declined to indict,
    the criminal charges and the trial came about
    only through the tenacity of a citizens’ group
    and a little-known system of judicial inquest,
    somewhat comparable to the US grand jury
    system minus prosecutorial involvement. See
    “Five-year prison terms sought for former
    TEPCO executives
    (http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ20181226
    0052.html),” Asahi Shimbun, December 26,
    2018.
    Acknowledgments
    Let me begin by thanking colleagues at APJJapan Focus—Gavan McCormack, Satoko
    Norimatsu, and Mark Selden—for their
    encouragement in pursuing this translation. I
    am grateful to Eiichiro Ochiai
    (https://apjjf.org/-Eiichiro-Ochiai/4382) and Bo
    Jacobs (https://apjjf.org/-Eiichiro-Ochiai/4382),
    whose work can also be found on this site, for
    their patient responses to my questions. Koide
    Hiroaki likewise responded generously. Errors
    that remain are my own (NF).
    Koide Hiroaki wrote the original text in
    response to a request by Ms. Kusumoto Junko,
    who translated, printed, and shipped it along
    with her own statement
    (https://cocomerita.exblog.jp/28702652/) to the
    various national Olympic committees. I am
    grateful to her for these actions. I also thank
    Mr. Koide for permission to produce this
    translation.
    Related articles
    “The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Is a
    Serious Crime
    (https://apjjf.org/2016/06/Hirano.html).”
    Interview with Koide Hiroaki by Katsuya
    Hirano and Hirotaka Kasai. APJ-Japan
    Focus, Vol 14, Issue 6:2, March 15, 2016.
    ”Save the Town”: Insolvable Dilemmas of
    Fukushima’s “Return Policy
    (https://apjjf.org/2018/03/Katsuya.html).”
    Interview with Namie Town Mayor Baba
    Tamotsu by Katsuya Hirano with
    Yoshihira Amaya and Yoh Kawano. APJJapan Focus, Vol. 16, Issue 3:2, February
    1, 2018.
    David McNeill and Paul Jobin, Japan’s
    3.11 Triple Disaster: Introduction to a
    Special Issue 特 集  3.11
    (https://apjjf.org/2014/12/7/David-McNeil
    l/4073/article.html). APJ-Japan Focus, Vol
    12, Issue 7:1, February 16, 2014.
    Notes are by the translator.
    The Following are the notes for the
    Introduction:
    Koide Hiroaki, retired from the Kyoto University Reactor Research Institute (presently
    called the Kyoto University Institute for Integrated Radiation and Nuclear Science Research),
    is arguably the most celebrated critic of nuclear power and the handling of the Fukushima
    disaster. He is the author of numerous books in Japanese, one of which has been translated
    into English, Rethinking Nuclear Energy: Autopsy of an Illusion (2014) and French, Penser le
    nucléaire: autopsie d’une illusion (2015). For a sustained, thoroughgoing interview in English,
    see “The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Is a Serious Crime
    (https://apjjf.org/2016/06/Hirano.html)” (2016). A succinct early interview is available in
    French: “Pour le nucléaire, il n’y a jamais de responsables. Trop d’intérêsts sont mêlés
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    12
    (https://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/Pour-le-nucleaire-il-n-y-a-jamais)” (2011), also translated
    into English: “Nuclear Irresponsibility: Koide Hiroaki Interviewed by Le Monde
    (https://apjjf.org/-Paul-Jobin/4699/article.html).” A two-part, illustrated presentation at the
    University of Chicago is available here
    (https://news.uchicago.edu/videos/atomic-age-ii-fukushima-session-1-part-1-english-0) and
    here (https://news.uchicago.edu/videos/atomic-age-ii-fukushima-session-1-part-2-english-0).
    The Trouble with Nuclear Power (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCbXX3DURd0) is an
    extensive presentation at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (2015).
    Norma Field, translator, is a professor emerita, University of Chicago. Recent publications
    include “From Fukushima: To Despair Properly, To Find the Next Step
    (https://apjjf.org/2016/17/Field.html)” (2016); For Dignity, Justice, and Revolution: An
    Anthology of Japanese Proletarian Literature
    (http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo5828625.html) (co-editor,
    2016); Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Has Been Committed?
    (https://www.amazon.com/FUKUSHIMA-RADIATION-Still-Crime-Committed-ebook/dp/B00XKI
    ZRX4?ie=UTF8&*Version*=1&*entries*=0) (editor and co-translator, 2015); Ima heiwa o
    honki de kataru ni wa: Inochi, jiyū, rekishi ([To seriously talk peace today: Life, freedom,
    history] Iwanami Booklet, 2018).
    Notes
    1 Much of the following account draws on Koide’s multiple public lectures and interviews as
    well as author interview on July 22, 2018. For the college years, see especially the evocative
    essay, “Sōmatō no yō ni meguru omoide” [Like memories swirling on a revolving lantern],
    Narisuna No. 201 (September 2005), available here
    (https://hiroakikoide.wordpress.com/2011/09/17/narisuna-sep13/).
    2 Of course, it was US President Dwight Eisenhower who launched the strategic dream of
    “peaceful uses” with its special implications for Japan with his “Atoms for Peace” speech
    before the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, not three months before the fateful
    Castle Bravo shot on Bikini atoll on March 1, 1954. See Yuki Tanaka and Peter Kuznick’s
    “Japan, the Atomic Bomb, and the ‘Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Power
    (https://apjjf.org/-Peter-J–Kuznick–Yuki-Tanaka/3521/article.pdf),’” APJ-Japan Focus (May 2,
    2011) and Ran Zwigenberg, “The Coming of a Second Sun”: The 1956 Atoms for Peace
    Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s Embrace of Nuclear Power
    (https://apjjf.org/2012/10/6/Ran-Zwigenberg/3685/article.html),” APJ-Japan Focus (February
    4, 2012).
    3
    Even while acknowledging its importance: see interview,
    (http://www.asiapress.org/apn/2015/03/japan/post_5462/) “Koide Hiroaki-san ni kiku:
    ‘Genshiryoku mura’ de wa naku ‘genshiryoku mafia’ da” [Mr. Koide Hiroaki’s views: It’s not a
    “nuclear village” but a “nuclear mafia”] (March 24, 2015).
    4
    The relative poverty of the areas where nuclear power plants have been constructed is an
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    13
    integral aspect of siting considerations. Koide is acutely sensitive to these and other
    discriminatory practices. “Remote,” in any case, is an exquisitely relative designation in a
    country as small and densely populated as Japan. See here
    (http://naglly.com/archives/2011/04/nuclear-japan-map.php) for a series of four maps of Japan,
    showing nuclear power stations in relation to major cities. If circles with a 20 km radius (12
    miles) are drawn around each plant, major cities fall outside their perimeters. But the
    situation changes drastically if the circle is expanded to 100 kms (62 miles). Double that, to
    200 kms (124 miles), and virtually all of Japan, never mind major cities, will be covered by
    overlapping circles.
    5
    As of April 2018, the Kyoto University Institute for Integrated Radiation and Nuclear Science
    (Kyoto Daigaku Fukugō Genshiryoku Kagaku Kenkyūsho).
    6 Koide moreover considers the Kumatori site as having been acquired by deception,
    inasmuch as Kyoto University signed an official agreement guaranteeing the impossible: that
    no radioactive materials would be released into the air or in the effluent discharged from the
    Institute.
    7
    See, for instance, “Tōdai nara katsudō dekinakatta; Kyōdai Koide jokyō ga konshun
    taishoku” [I couldn’t have sustained my activities at Todai; Kyodai assistant professor Koide
    retiring this spring], Sunday Mainichi
    (http://mainichibooks.com/sundaymainichi/society/2015/03/15/post-5.html), March 15, 2018;
    and “Koide Hiroaki Kyōdai jokyō teinen intabyū [Koide Hiroaki, Kyoto University assistant
    professor, retirement intervew], Tokyo Shimbun, March 23, 2015, available here
    (https://silmarilnecktie.wordpress.com/2015/03/23/323%E3%80%90%E6%9D%B1%E4%BA%
    AC%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E3%83%BB%E7%89%B9%E5%A0%B1%E3%80%91%E5%B0
    %8F%E5%87%BA%E8%A3%95%E7%AB%A0-
    %E4%BA%AC%E5%A4%A7%E5%8A%A9%E6%95%99%E3%83%BB%E5%AE%9A%E5%B9%
    B4%E3%82%A4/).
    8
    Text of speech, delivered in English, here
    (http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/07ioc_presentation_e.html).
    9
    See here
    (https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2013/09/09/fukushima_nuclear_power_polution_n_3896462.ht
    ml).
    10 Mainichi report, (https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20181005/p2a/00m/0na/003000c)
    beginning with actual Board of Audit accounting from October 2018.
    11 See “Japan’s Olympics Chief Faces Corruption Charges in France
    (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/world/europe/japan-olympics-corruption-tsunekazu-tak
    eda.html),” New York Times, January 11, 2019.
    12 “Radiation Doses Underestimated in Study of City in Fukushima
    (http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201901090057.html),” Asahi Shimbun, January 9, 2019.
    See also “Journal flags articles about radiation exposure following Fukushima disaster
    (https://retractionwatch.com/2019/01/17/journal-flags-papers-about-radiation-exposure-followi
    ng-fukushima-disaster/)” in Retraction Watch; and especially, Shin-ichi Kurokawa and Akemi
    Shima, “A Glass Badge Study That Failed and Betrayed Residents: A Study with Seven
    Violations of Ethical Guidelines Can Be No Basis for Government Policies
    (https://www.iwanami.co.jp/kagaku/eKagaku_201902_Kurokawa_Shima.pdf),” Kagaku, Vol.
    89:2, February 2019.
    APJ | JF 17 | 5 | 3
    14
    13 “Shinsaigo ‘hōshasen niko-niko shiteiru hito ni eikyō nai’ Yamashita Nagasaki-dai kyōju
    ‘shinkoku na kanōsei’
    (http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/national/list/201901/CK2019012802000122.html) kenkai
    kiroku (http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/national/list/201901/CK2019012802000122.html)”
    [“No radiation effects on people who keep smiling” post-earthquake: Record of “serious
    possibility” noted by Nagasaki University Professor Yamashita], Tokyo Shimbun, January 28,
    2019.
    14 “Kantei ni ‘ekigaku chōsa fuyō’ Fukushima gempatsu jiko de Hōiken riji
    (http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/national/list/201902/CK2019021802000125.html)” [“No
    epidemiological study necessary”: Director of NIRS to Prime Minister’s Office following
    Fukushima nuclear accident], Tokyo Shimbun, February 18, 2019.
    15 “‘Seika rirē’yūchi ni hisaichi Fukushima no jūmin ga hiyayaka na wake” [Why the disasterafflicted residents of Fukushima are cool to hosting the ‘Olympic torch’ relay], Shūkan
    Kinyōbi (http://www.kinyobi.co.jp/kinyobinews/2018/10/31/antena-356/) (October 31, 2018).
    See also her “Follow Up on Thyroid Cancer! Patient Group Voices Opposition to Scaling Down
    the Fukushima Prefectural Health Survey (https://apjjf.org/2017/02/Aihara.html),” APJ-Japan
    Focus (January 15, 2017).